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This study explores two important aspects o f entrepreneurship -  liquidity constraints and 
serial entrepreneurs, with an additional analysis of occupational choice among wage 
workers. In the first essay, I revisit the question of whether entrepreneurs face liquidity 
constraints in business formation. The principle challenge is that wealth is correlated with 
unobserved ability, and adequate instruments are often difficult to identify. This paper 
uses the son’s birth order as an instrument for household wealth. I exploit the data 
available in the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study, and find evidence of liquidity 
constraints associated with self-employment in South Korea. The second essay develops 
and tests a model that explains entry into serial entrepreneurship and the performance of 
serial entrepreneurs as the result of selection on innate ability. The model supposes that 
agents establish businesses with imperfect information about their entrepreneurial ability 
and the profitability of business ideas. Agents continually observe signals with which 
they update their beliefs, and this process eventually determines their next business 
choice. Selection on ability induces a positive correlation between entrepreneurial 
experience (measured by previous business earnings and founding experience) and serial
business formation, as well as its subsequent performance. The predictions in the model 
are tested using panel data from the NLSY79. The analysis permits a distinction to be 
made between selection on innate ability and learning by doing. Motivated by previous 
empirical findings that white-collar workers had higher turnover rates than blue-collar 
workers during firm expansion, the third essay further examines job turnover among 
workers with or without specific skills. I present a search-matching model, which predicts 
that when firm growth is driven by technological advance, workers whose skills are 
specific to the obsolete technology show a higher tendency to separate from their jobs. 
This hypothesis is tested with data from the PSID. I find supportive evidence that in the 
context of technological change, having an occupation requiring specific skills, such as 
computer specialists or engineers, increases the odds o f job separation by nearly eight 
percent.
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INTRODUCTION
Thanks to Schumpeter’s (1942) seminal work relating entrepreneurship to the “gale of 
creative destruction”, entrepreneurship has returned to the focus of public policy and 
attracted increasing interests from academic researchers. From a policy maker’s point of 
view, entrepreneurship not only stimulates innovations, but provides a bridge out of 
poverty and sustains long-run economic growth. Thus, public programs that aim to 
encourage the creation of small and medium-sized businesses have been strongly favored 
by governments all over the world. A well-known example is the guaranteed loan 
programs provided by the US Small Business Administration which provides financial 
assistance to potential business owners.
This public enthusiasm about business creation is accompanied by an increasing inquiry 
of entrepreneurship from academic scholars. A large number of theories and quantitative 
analysis have been developed to understand entrepreneurship, and subsequently bring out 
many policy-relevant questions which have not been well addressed. For instance, while 
many governments are eager to encourage new business creation by providing financial 
assistance under the belief that entrepreneurs face wealth constraints, an intensive debate 
among authors of recent studies raises the question of how reliable the empirical evidence 
of wealth constraints is because of endogeneity problem (Blanchflower and Oswald 1991, 
etc.). Moreover, using large and representative data samples, the literature on returns to 
self-employment reports the evidence that entrepreneurs generally work harder, but on 
average earn less than wage workers, giving rise to the doubt of whether entrepreneurship 
really makes people better off than staying in the wage sector (Hamilton 2000). Gompers 
et al. (2006) further argue that business success is determined by innate entrepreneurial
skills rather than experience in general, implying that entrepreneurship should not be 
overly-encouraged, but subjected to self-selection.
Discussions on these issues are interesting, as they help us understand individuals’ 
occupational choice, entrepreneurs’ business decisions, and the dynamics o f firms. These 
studies also provide policy makers’ with theoretical and empirical justification on the 
types of businesses that governments should encourage, the capacity of entrepreneurship 
that is optimal for the economy, and the role of government intervention in successfully 
promoting entrepreneurial innovation and economic growth.
Entrepreneurship research is tremendous, and as Parker (2005) points out, it requires 
wisdoms from multidisciplinary fields, and the topics could go from individual 
occupational choice, to firm growth, and further to economic development. The aim of 
this study is to focus on controversial issues associated with three aspects of 
entrepreneurship, that is, wealth constraints, selection on ability, and learning by doing. 
As an extension, I also apply the similar notion of optimizing behavior to analyzing labor 
turnover in the wage-employment setting.
The study consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I revisit a familiar question of 
whether entrepreneurs face wealth constraints when they start businesses. The prima 
facie evidence of wealth constraints is a positive relationship between personal wealth 
and entry into self-employment. The principle challenge for testing this relationship is 
that wealth is correlated with unobserved (entrepreneurial) ability, and adequate 
instruments for wealth are often difficult to identify. In previous studies, the most 
commonly-adopted instruments are windfall gains, such as inheritance (Holtz-Eakin, 
Joulfaian, and Rosen 1994a, 1994b), lottery winnings (Lindh and Ohlsson 1996), and
capital gains on housing (Hurst and Lusardi 2004). These studies, however, face the 
criticism, which emphasizes an indirect relationship between the adopted instruments and 
entrepreneurial ability through either family specific characteristics (e.g., parents’ wealth, 
family business history, or family social capital) or individual personalities (e.g., degree 
of risk-aversion, or satisfaction of current economic condition). In this paper, I take a 
different approach by using birth order as an alternative instrument for wealth. The fact 
that primogeniture remains important in South Korea ensures a strong relationship 
between a person’s household wealth and his birth order. Most important, as birth order is 
randomly determined, it does not depend on any family-specific characteristics. A 
potential concern about the validity of this instrument is its correlation with individual 
personalities and educational achievement, which may affect one’s entrepreneurial 
propensity in the future. Nonetheless, an extensive review of evidence from the literature 
of psychology and labor economics shows that these correlations are not always 
significant, and should not induce serious bias in the results. Using data from the Korean 
Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS), I find strong and positive correlation between 
entry into self-employment and personal wealth instrumented with birth order. This result 
supports the hypothesis of wealth constraints faced by prospective entrepreneurs. From 
the point of view of policy makers, this means fewer employment opportunities and 
lower self-employment returns because of inefficient capital levels. In this particular case 
of South Korea, certain financial assistance from the government, therefore, becomes 
especially necessary.
Earlier studies of entrepreneurship mostly focus on the transition into self-employment 
from wage sector or unemployment. There have been extensive discussions on what
determines entrepreneurial entry — whether this occupational choice is related to an 
individual’s employment history (Astebro, Chen, and Thompson 2010), degree of risk 
aversion (Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979), or taste for variety (Wagner 2003, 2006; Lazear 
2005; Astebro and Thompson 2007). An important insight from these studies is that there 
is a variety of motivations that can lead individuals to enter entrepreneurship. Aside from 
the classic reasoning of “entrepreneurial spirit”, entrepreneurial entry could also be 
explained by attraction to non-pecuniary benefits (e.g., being one’s boss, child caring), or 
lack of opportunities in wage sector (Reynolds et al. 2005). As a result, nascent 
entrepreneurs in general have less stable self-employment status, which poses difficulties 
for a deeper exploration of entrepreneurial activities over a long time span. Thus, recent 
studies have revealed an increasing interest in serial entrepreneurs, who have started 
several new businesses after having founded and exited their previous ventures. Because 
they are more persistent in entrepreneurship and have affluent business experiences, 
serial entrepreneurs are an ideal research object for understanding questions such as how 
entrepreneurs choose business ideas, what factors affect their investment decisions, what 
makes the difference between entrepreneur stars and misfits, etc.
In spite of all the desirable characteristics of serial entrepreneurs for research purposes, a 
more fundamental question that seems to have attracted less attention is why serial 
entrepreneurs exist. In other words, what motivates an entrepreneur to leave his old 
business and start a new venture? The answers provided by previous studies are sporadic, 
and are mostly drawn from small-sample surveys or interviews. Except for the earlier 
work of Holmes and Schumitz (1990) on business transfer, few theoretical models so far 
have been developed to formalize this entrepreneurial behavior.
To fill this gap in the literature, I develop and test a model in the second chapter that 
explains entry into serial entrepreneurship as the result of selection on innate ability. The 
model supposes that agents establish businesses with imperfect information about their 
entrepreneurial ability and the profitability o f business ideas. By continually observing 
signals, agents gradually update their beliefs about both factors, and this process 
eventually determines their next business choice. An essential insight of the model is that 
selection on ability is sufficient to induce a positive correlation between entrepreneurial 
experience (measured by previous business earnings and founding experience) and serial 
business formation, as well as the subsequent performance o f the new business. This 
result provides a theoretical basis for a debate in the empirical literature on whether the 
impact of prior experience on current entrepreneurial performance should be explained 
by learning by doing (Eesley and Roberts 2006a) or should be attributed to 
entrepreneurial innate skills (Gompers et al. 2006).
To test the hypothesis of selection on ability and further distinguish this effect from 
learning by doing, I constructed a panel data set from the NLSY79, and apply both IV 
estimation and the fixed-effects model to isolate the above two mechanisms. The results 
show that both selection on ability and learning by doing could be captured by 
entrepreneurial experience. Selection on ability is a more dominant explanation on the 
positive relationship between experience and new business formation, while learning by 
doing plays a much bigger role in interpreting the positive impact of founding experience 
on new business performance.
While serial entrepreneurs have to make a decision between keeping the same business 
and starting a new one, a similarly interesting question is how workers make their
occupational choice, either within the wage sector, or between wage sector and self- 
employment. The latter movement has been noticed in an extensive literature that 
documents the coexistence of opportunity or star entrepreneurs -  who enter self- 
employment to seek higher returns to human capital, and necessity or misfit 
entrepreneurs -  who are forced into self-employment because of limited work 
opportunities in the wage sector.
In the last chapter, I rather look away from the business sector, but focus on labor 
turnover and movement that occur within wage employment. This chapter is motivated 
by two pieces of empirical evidence presented by Dohmen and Pfann (2004) and Lazear 
(1999). Both studies coincidentally show that workers with more human capital exhibit 
higher turnover rates than those with less human capital. This result is at odds with 
human capital theory, which predicts that higher-ranked workers have more stable 
employment. To provide a possible explanation on this empirical finding, this chapter 
examines labor turnover in the context of firm-wise technology updating. The model 
suggests that when human capital is not firm-specific and there is technological change in 
the firm, workers who have specific capital and are occupied on high-level jobs have a 
greater tendency to separate from the firm and look for a better job match. The prediction 
is tested using data from the US Panel Study o f  Income Dynamics (PSID). I find 
supportive evidence which shows that, where there is an industry-wide increasing in 
productivity, having an occupation that requires specific skills, such as computer 
specialists, engineers, or professional workers, increases the likelihood of job separation 
by nearly eight percent.
The contributions of this study are twofold. From the theoretical perspective, this is the 
first study that applies the notion of selection on ability to explaining the origin of serial 
entrepreneurship, although similar ideas have long been formalized to model firm 
dynamics (Jovanovic 1982). Selection yields some implications for serial 
entrepreneurship that can easily be misconstrued as the result of learning by doing, and 
therefore raises doubts about whether we have correctly understood some of the existing 
empirical evidence. Furthermore, the framework of job matching developed in the third 
chapter can be easily extended to include the option of self-employment to explore 
individuals’ occupational choice within and beyond the wage sector in the context of 
technological change.
From the empirical standpoint, the present analysis is founded on three large and 
representative panel data samples, which not only uncover detailed information of 
respondents’ demographic characteristics and their employment history, but allow cross­
country comparisons on labor mobility, occupational preference, and entrepreneurial 
culture. In terms of empirical methodology, this study proposes two novel instrumental 
strategies. One is to instrument household assets with the family head’s birth order in the 
test of wealth constraints. This approach aims to tackle the endogeneity problem arising 
from the correlation between wealth and unobserved ability, without inducing any 
indirect relationship between the instrument and the troublesome variable. In the second 
IV estimation, I instrument previous entrepreneurial experience with the entrepreneur’s 
initial earnings in his first job and his first business, both of which reflect a person’s 
innate ability. This approach successfully isolates the role of selection on ability from 
learning by doing in determining new business formation and performance. The results
shed light on some long-debated questions, such as what exactly (serial) entrepreneurs 
learned from their experience, and whether learning really improves their entrepreneurial 
performance.
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CHAPTER 1 
Wealth Constraints and Self-Employment: Evidence from Birth Order
1.1 Introduction
A critical problem facing a would-be entrepreneur is whether there is enough capital to 
start the business. If access to outside finance is restricted, his personal wealth certainly 
would play a significant role in meeting the initial capital requirement. As a result, a 
positive relationship between personal wealth and entry into self-employment provides 
prima facie evidence that financial constraints affect new business formation. On the 
basis of this logic, early empirical work, normally using net family assets to measure 
wealth, consistently finds evidence of liquidity constraints in entrepreneurship (Evans 
and Jovanovic 1989; Evans and Leighton 1989). However, as widely noted in subsequent 
studies, household assets are not an exogenous proxy for wealth. They are positively 
correlated with unobserved entrepreneurial ability, which may have a dominant effect on 
a person’s propensity to become self-employed. Studies that fail to account for this 
endogeneity overestimate the role of personal wealth, and therefore yield spurious 
evidence of financial market imperfections.
The ideal solution is, of course, to find an instrument for wealth. A popular choice has 
been inheritance, lottery winnings, or capital gains on housing (Blanchflower and Oswald 
1991; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1994a, 1994b; Hurst and Lusardi 2004; Lindh 
and Ohlsson 1996; Georgellis, Sessions, and Tsitsianis 2005). The underlying rationale 
for choosing these variables as an instrument for wealth is that inheritance, lottery 
winnings, or capital gains on housing are windfall gains, which one supposes should have 
no direct relationship with unobserved ability. However, as part of household wealth,
these instruments still bear the risk of being indirectly related to unobserved ability either 
through individual personalities or family-specific characteristics.
First, consider inheritance. As we know, the size of inheritance depends on the wealth of 
parents; while a wealthy family is also likely to have other characteristics favorable to 
successful business formation, including good education, successful career experience, 
and extensive social networks. All these factors may affect the entrepreneurial prospects 
of any individual. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) offer some direct evidence in their study 
of the intergenerational transmission of wealth and experience. First, they find that self- 
employed parents tend to be much wealthier than wage-employed parents. They further 
show that the entrepreneurial histories of parents have a strong positive effect on a son’s 
entry into entrepreneurship. In contrast, the impact of the financial capital of parents is 
quite small. These findings suggest two separate effects that may be captured by 
inheritance on the entry of self-employment: a pure wealth effect and the effect of family- 
specific human capital, such as entrepreneurial skills, managerial human capital, or 
knowledge of business. Hurst and Lusardi (2004) suggest a way to test the correlation 
between inheritance and these unobserved family-specific factors. The underlying 
mechanism is that if inheritance is simply a proxy for liquidity constraints, we would 
only expect a significant effect on the probability of starting a business of inheritance 
received in the past. In contrast, if inheritance also proxies for other factors such as 
entrepreneurial ability, then both past inheritance and future inheritance should predict 
current business entry. Their result shows almost equivalent effects of these two types of 
inheritance on the probability of starting a business, which proves again that inheritance 
is likely an invalid instrument for wealth.
Lottery winnings might appear to be less likely than inheritance to be related to any 
personal or family characteristics. Nonetheless, the problem with lottery winnings is that 
they are likely to be associated with low-ability or low-income people who wish to 
change the direction of their fortune by buying lottery tickets. It is well-known that low- 
income and less-educated families buy lottery tickets at a much greater rate than do high- 
income educated families (see McCrary and Pavlak [2002] for a review). If income and 
education are mismeasured, then this alone would invalidate lottery winnings as an 
instrument of wealth. Moreover, there is also evidence that lottery demand is related to 
characteristics that are likely unobservable to econometricians even in the best of 
circumstances. Brenner (1986), for example, reports from a Canadian survey of 93 lottery 
winners that u[t]he image of the lottery ticket buyer that emerges . . .  is of a person who, 
finding all other avenues of success closed because of one form or other of sudden 
adversity, turns to lotteries as a recourse.”
Hurst and Lusardi (2004) use capital gains on housing as an instrument for change in 
wealth. There are reservations about using capital gains on housing for two main reasons. 
First, the size of capital gains on housing depends on the size of the house, which, again, 
is positively related to the owner’s entrepreneurial ability. Second, the appreciation of 
housing price is usually higher in densely populated cities with expanding economic 
opportunities, places where people are more likely to be attracted to entrepreneurship 
because of abundant opportunities. To ameliorate these problems, Hurst and Lusardi 
(2004) obtained regional variations in house prices after controlling for household 
demographics and regional economic activity. These unpredicted variations are then
assigned to each household by region, and then used as an instrument for household 
wealth.
A recent study by Nanda (2008) examines the effect of a tax reform in Denmark on entry 
into entrepreneurship. Departing from the prior research which looks into the existence of 
liquidity constraints through the relationship between wealth and entrepreneurial entry, 
Nanda (2008) exploits an exogenous change in the cost of finance to distinguish the 
effect of wealth constraints on entrepreneurship from other unobservable factors that may 
affect a person’s propensity to become an entrepreneur.
In this paper, I follow the traditional approach of finding a suitable instrument for wealth. 
What distinguish the present study from previous work is that the instrument constructed 
solely builds on the specific primogenitary aspect of Korean culture.
South Korea has normally been regarded as a male-dominant society in which fidelity to 
one’s parents is highly valued. Prendergast (2005) describes the traditional role of the 
eldest son in South Korea, which is extremely significant. In the past, the eldest son was 
expected to remain in the house, care for elderly parents, and take responsibilities of the 
whole family. In return, he would receive most, sometimes all, of the parents’ bequest. 
Although this traditional family tie between the eldest son and his parents has weakened 
as more and more Koreans migrate from rural areas to the cities for either education or 
job opportunities, the preference for the eldest son to be the primary heir remains strong 
among elderly South Koreans. Indeed, until 1990, it was written into law that the eldest 
son should receive an inheritance twice the amount of that received by other sons. In 
1990 this rule was abolished and replaced with provisions requiring an equal share of 
inheritance among all siblings, regardless of sex. But this change in law is frequently
circumvented in practice. A very common way is for parents to transfer much of their 
wealth to their sons, and especially to their eldest son, when the parents are still alive. 
This practice leads to the fundamental identifying strategy of this paper. That is, being the 
eldest son in Korea is correlated with an individual’s wealth, through either inheritance or 
pre-mortem wealth transfer from parents. Moreover, a person’s birth order is not, ceteris 
paribus, likely to be affected by unobserved family characteristics, and is not correlated 
with economic or regional factors. Thus, an indicator variable recording whether an 
individual is the eldest son is a promising candidate instrument for wealth in South Korea 
and other countries with similar tradition, although this instrument is unlikely to be 
especially useful in the west such as the United States, where there is little correlation 
between birth order and inheritance.
There are several concerns about the usefulness of this instrument. One relates to the 
eldest son’s responsibility of taking care of elderly parents, which inevitably involves 
some substantial expenditure. Although nowadays this filial obligation tends to be shared 
by all offspring, in customary practice, it is still the eldest son or the well-off child who is 
expected to provide more financial support to the parents than other siblings (see 
Prendergast 2005). Thus, although the eldest son receives more wealth transfer from 
parents, his financial responsibility for the parents may reduce this pecuniary benefit, 
perhaps to the extent that it fully offsets the positive wealth effect of being the eldest son. 
The problem hinges on how to distinguish these two methods of wealth transfer and 
obtain a clear-cut wealth effect of being the eldest son. My strategy relies on sorting the 
eldest son into two types -  with or without college education, and treating them 
separately. The reason is as follows. For many Korean parents, paying for a child’s
college education is considered as an alternative way of wealth transmission. Hence, in 
many cases, if the eldest son has a college education, parents prefer to leave more wealth 
to his siblings who did not go to college. This behavior of parents is based on two 
considerations. On one hand, parents think that if they already paid for the eldest son’s 
college education, which often consumes a large part of family wealth, his siblings 
should receive the bulk of the remaining family wealth. On the other hand, parents also 
believe that life should be relatively easier for children who have obtained college 
education. Hence, children without college education should receive more help from the 
family. According to this practice, there should be a positive relationship between being 
the eldest son and a person’s wealth if the son is not college-educated. In contrast, this 
relationship should become much weaker or even turn to be negative among those with 
college education, as the college-educated eldest son is likely to receive relatively less 
wealth transfer from the parents, but instead is expected to provide more financial support 
to the parents and the family.
The second concern about the quality of the instrument is that birth order may capture 
other factors besides its impact on wealth. Among previous studies on birth order, the 
fundamental focus is its linkage to the allocation of parental resources (such as financial 
and time inputs) and the subsequent child outcomes in terms of personality, educational 
attainment, and other social behaviors.
In the psychology literature, there has been a long debate about whether a person’s 
personality is associated with his or her birth order. Sulloway (1996) points out that 
children compete for parental resources in the family by creating distinctive niches. As a 
result, firstborn children tend to be more responsible, competitive, and conventional than
younger siblings because their position is already established. In contrast, laterbom 
children must distinguish themselves by being playful, cooperative, and rebellious. 
Sulloway’s (1996) theory raises doubts about using birth order as an instrument for 
wealth in this context, as the eldest son may possess certain characteristics that make him 
more likely to enter into self-employment. However, this theory does not appear to be 
consistent with many empirical studies, which find no significant birth order effects in 
various personality categories (see Jefferson et al., [1998] for a review). Furthermore, 
earlier studies also argue that personalities developed in childhood are not always 
retained in adulthood (Block [1993], Siegler et al., [1990]). These empirical findings 
suggest that birth-order effects on personalities, if existing, are probably very small, and 
should not be a concern in the following IV estimations.
Even if Sulloway’s (1996) theory holds, we can indirectly test the impacts of 
personalities captured by birth order on entry into self-employment by examining the 
eldest daughter’s entrepreneurial propensity. Since the eldest daughter, who has 
personalities associated with the first-born child, has little privilege in sharing parents’ 
wealth, a positive relationship between being the eldest daughter and a person’s 
probability of becoming self-employed would imply that birth order captures factors 
other than wealth, such as personalities, which affect entrepreneurial entry. In the 
unreported regressions, I include a dummy variable for the eldest daughter, and do not 
find any significant effect of being the eldest daughter on a person’s likelihood of 
becoming self-employed. The results further confirm my conclusion that the potential 
correlation between birth order and personalities should not prevent birth order from 
being a valid instrument for wealth in South Korea.
Another factor that birth order may capture is educational attainment. About birth order 
effects on parental educational investment, there has not been a unanimous view in the 
literature. While some studies find a negative birth order effect on children’s education 
(Black, Devereux, and Sal vanes 2005; Booth and Kee 2005; Conley and Glauber 2005), 
others find the completely opposite result. Ejmass and Portner (2004), for example, argue 
that in the Philippines, laterbom children actually have an advantage over their earlier- 
born siblings regarding completed education.1 Regardless of the exact relationship 
between birth order and education, an essential question is whether education is an 
important factor that is involved in entry into self-employment. Previous longitudinal 
studies relieve this concern by suggesting that the effect of formal education on the 
probability of becoming self-employed is not significant after we control for individuals’ 
earnings and occupation (See Georgellis, Sessions, and Tsitsianis [2005] for a review). 
The third main issue regarding this instrument arises from its correlation with family size. 
Although in which order a person is bom appears to be exogenous, the probability of 
being the eldest son increases if a person has a smaller number of siblings. As the size of 
a family is often related to the parents’ education and ability, the variation in family size 
causes a potential endogeneity problem. Another related issue is that wealth is more 
diluted in a larger family. Hence, the portion of wealth transferred to the children, even 
the eldest son, could be relatively small in large families, which adds limited contribution 
to the children’s overall wealth. These two problems can be alleviated by either adding 
controls for the sibling count or restricting the sample to individuals with a similar 
number of siblings.
1 Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2005) use data from Norway, Booth and Kee (2005) use data from  
Britain, and data used by C onley and Glauber (2005) are from the U.S.
I implement the IV estimation of the effect of wealth on the probability of becoming self- 
employed using data from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study. My analysis 
focuses on the annual transitions from wage employment to self-employment. Individuals 
who were running a family business are not included in the study, as the operation of 
family business has its own distinctive features and is more related to family-specific 
characteristics. Without controlling for the number of siblings, the estimated effect of 
wealth instrumented with the son’s birth order is positive for both the educated and 
uneducated groups of observations. But the result is not statistically significant. A 
plausible explanation for obtaining an insignificant result is the noise of the instrument 
caused by the variations in the sibling count. Simply adding the sibling count does not 
change the significance of the result, probably because of the large difference in the 
number of siblings which varies from 0 to 16 in my sample. If I adopt the second 
strategy and limit the sample to individuals who report having 3-5 siblings, the wealth 
effect generated in the restricted sample is positive and significant, which provides 
support for the existence of liquidity constraints. It is worth noting that this result does 
not imply that wealth constraints only exist among individuals coming from medium­
sized families. Instead, by restricting the sample to individuals with similar number of 
siblings, I intend to improve the quality the instrument, which helps to generate more 
reliable results.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief description of the 
data construction and some summary statistics. To illustrate the key problems of the 
analysis, section 3 presents the results from a baseline probit regression without 
instrumenting. Section 4 provides the cultural background that supports the intuition of
the instrumental variable. Section 5 reports the IV estimates along with some robustness 
checks. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this paper come from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study 
(KLIPS). The KLIPS is a longitudinal survey of originally 5,000 South Korean urban 
households and their family members. The data contain information on household and 
personal demographics, as well as individuals’ employment history. Starting in 1998, the 
KLIPS has been completed up to 2005 (the 8th wave). In this study, I focus on the five 
survey years spanning 2000 to 2004 (the 3rd Wave - the 7th Wave). This provides a 
sample of total 4,999 individuals who were either wage workers or self-employed 
workers throughout the period. Not all individuals remained in the sample for all five 
years. The mean participation in the sample is 2.1 years, providing me with 10,522 
observations on these individuals.
In this section, I provide some of the descriptive statistical summaries of the sample. A 
more detailed description of the data set and variable construction is presented in the 
appendix. Table 1.1 summarizes the sample demographics by employment status. Sixty- 
eight percent of the sample was male; 26% was 35 years old or below, and 61% was aged 
between 36 and 55; around 35% had college degree; and the majority people in the 
sample were married (88%). The fraction married is large because the sample contains 
observations on household heads and their spouses if they have one— if spouses are 
excluded, the fraction married was 79 percent.
Table 1.2 summarizes the distribution of employment status by demographics. As it 
shows, male, non-college educated, married, and middle-aged individuals are more likely
to be self-employed. The column and rows labeled “TRANSITION” provide information 
on observations recording a one-year transition from wage employment to self- 
employment.
T a b l e  1.1
Demographic Distribution by Employm ent Status and Transition into Self-Em ploym ent
T o t a l S e l f-E m p l o y e d W a g e -E a r n e r T r a n s it i o n s
M a le 68 73.9 66.1 78.8
C o l l e g e 35.4 26.8 38.2 38.8
M a r r i e d 87.9 90.6 87 90.6
A ge
19-35 26.4 12.9 30.9 30.6
36-45 35.4 35.2 35.5 29.4
46-55 25.4 32.6 22.9 30.6
>56 12.8 19.2 10.7 9.4
Figures are percentages o f  each colum n falling into each row class. 10,522 observations.
Twenty-six percent of the sample reported being self-employed, though only 0.8 percent 
of the total observations involved a transition from the wage sector to self-employment. 
This number, however, may modestly underestimate the real rate of transition, as nearly 
four percent of the sample already reported being self-employed the first time it was 
observed. Some of these observations may correspond to a switch from wage- 
employment to self-employment, but I am not able to identify them. Nonetheless it is 
clear that self-employment is both common and stable in South Korea. One percent of 
male respondents made at least one switch from wage-employment to self-employment, 
compared to only 0.5 percent among female respondents. The probability o f transition is 
also slightly higher among married and college-educated people. Although the rate of 
self-employment is highest among those over age 55, the great majority of transitions into
self-employment occur at younger ages. This is consistent with the stylized fact that older 
people are less likely to switch to self-employment.
T a b l e  1.2
Distribution o f  Employm ent Status by Dem ographic Variables
A g e  R a n g e
T o t a l 19-35 3 6 -4 5 4 6 -5 5 >5 5
S e l f -E m p l o y e d 2 6 .2 12.2 2 4 .8 32.1 37 .3
T r a n s it i o n 0.81 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.6
G e n d e r C o l l e g e  E d u c a t e d M a r i t a l  S t a t u s
M a l e Fe m a l e Y es N o M a r r i e d S ingle
S elf-E m p l o y e d 2 7 .0 2 0 .4 18.9 2 8 .2 25 .7 19.3
T r a n s it i o n 0.9 0.5 0 .9  0 .8 0 .8 0.6
Figures are percentages o f  each colum n falling into each row class. 10 ,522  observations.
T a b l e  1.3 
Summary Statistics by Industry
P e r c e n t a g e
T o t a l S e l f -E m p l o y e d W a g e -E a r n e r
M a n u f a c t u r i n g 2 5 .6 14.6 29 .3
W h o l e s a l e  a n d  R etail 15.7 33 .2 9 .9
C o n s t r u c t i o n 9.7 6.6 10.7
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  a n d  C o m m u n i c a t i o n 7.4 8.8 6.9
E d u c a t i o n 7.3 3.3 8.7
H o t e l s  a n d  R e s t a u r a n t s 6.5 11.8 4 .7
C o m m u n i t y , R e p a ir , a n d  P e r s o n a l  S er vic e 5.8 8.7 4 .8
F i n a n c i a l  In s t i t u t i o n  a n d  In s u r a n c e 4 .7 1.3 5.8
O th e r 17.3 11.7 19.2
T o t a l  O b s e r v a t i o n s 10 ,522 2 ,6 2 0 7 ,9 0 2
Table 1.3 summarizes the distribution of wage earners and the self-employed across 
major industries. Wage earners are more heavily represented in manufacturing, 
construction, and education. The self-employed are more likely to be found in service 
industries, especially in retail and wholesale where over one third of the self-employed 
worked.
1.3 Self-Employment and Wealth Constraints: Probit Estimates
In the previous studies of liquidity constraints, a general baseline specification for the 
estimation is
se {fe„ =  Pi) +  P \a„-\ +  K 0 2 +  ^ 0 - i  A  + £ u ( l )
where the dummy variable, selfe„ indicates an annual transition into self-employment; at 
is household wealth; I, and X, are two sets of control variables. The term, Ih is a vector of 
observed demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, marital status, and educational 
attainment, while X, is a vector of employment variables, including previous wage 
earnings, years o f work experience, indicator variables of employment and occupation, 
etc. The variable, £,, represents all other determinants of the transition into self- 
employment, including an individual’s unobserved entrepreneurial attributes. Before 
proceeding to estimate equation (1), assumptions about three key explanatory variables, 
household wealth, wages, and educational attainment, merit some discussion.
1.3.1 Linearity in Wealth
Equation (1) specifies a linear relationship between household wealth and the probability 
of becoming self-employed.3 Previous work also tends to report results from nonlinear 
specifications. For example, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) estimate a nonlinear wealth model 
with a fifth-order polynomial in wealth. They conclude that the nonlinear specification 
fits the data better, as a simple linear relationship is likely to be driven by households at 
the top of the wealth distribution.
2 Few studies actually control for all these terms. M ost studies include som e subset o f  these variables.
' Here 1 fo llow  Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and refer equation (1) as the “linear” specification for wealth. In 
contrast, a model that involves the higher power o f  wealth is referred as a “nonlinear” specification for 
wealth.
To decide which model is more appropriate for the South Korean sample, I first run 
several simple regressions using both linear and non-linear specifications. The variable of 
wealth is constructed based on the formula used by Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Xu 
(1997): Net Assets=Investment in Real Estate + Financial Assets (including Savings, 
Stocks, Bonds, Insurance, Loans to friends or relatives, and other financial assets) -  
Debts (including balance of debt from bank/non-bank, balance borrowed from private 
route, balance from loans, and other debts). All these variables are originally measured in 
units of 10 million Korean won (KW), approximately US$10,000. Net assets are 
expressed in real value with the base year of 2000. The essential argument for using birth 
order as an instrument for wealth is the plausible relationship between being the eldest 
son and a person’s household wealth. But this relationship may not be found in poor 
families, as parents do not have much to give, even to the eldest son. In this case, the 
instrument would be uninformative, which is the downside of this approach. The concern 
is substantiated in an unreported analysis, where I run the first stage regression in two 
subsamples. The first subsample only includes observations reporting positive net 
household assets, and the second subsample only consists of those reporting negative net 
assets. In the former case, being the eldest son increases a person’s household assets by 
9,200,000 won (around 8363 US dollars), and the result is significant at the one percent 
level. In contrast, among observations with negative household assets, which are also 
more likely to be associated with poor family background and low education, I find no 
significant relationship between wealth and a son’s birth order. Based on the 
consideration o f the relevance of the instrument, the current analysis only focuses on 
individuals with positive household assets. Respondents who reported negative household
assets or had missing information on assets are removed from the sample. This way also 
gives me the convenience of using logarithm of wealth in the later analysis.
Column (1) in Table 1.4 shows the results from the linear specification. Consistent with 
previous findings, the effect o f wealth on the probability of becoming self-employed is 
positive and significant at the ten percent level. However, the marginal effect is quite 
small: for each US$100,000 increase in household assets, the probability of becoming 
self-employed increases by 0.3 percent. This number is close to the 0.5 percent reported 
by Hurst and Lusardi (2004) using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
In Column (2) of Table 1.4, a quadratic in assets is added to the regression. The marginal 
effect of wealth on the probability of self-employment is 0.5 percent for each $100,000 
increase in household assets, which is slightly higher than the marginal effect obtained in 
the linear model. The opposite signs of the two coefficients suggest that the effect of 
wealth on the probability of switching to self-employment declines as wealth rises, but 
the estimated coefficient on the squared term is not significant at the conventional ten 
percent level.
Bartus (2005) has suggested that, to find out whether the nonlinear effect o f a variable is 
increasing at a decreasing rate or is inversely U-shaped, we can check the value of the 
original term that maximizes the linear prediction. If the value is within the range of the 
original term, then the effect is inversely U-shaped. In this model, the linear prediction- 
maximizing value of assets is 285.92, which is higher than its maximum 225.84. This 
implies that the marginal effect of assets on the odds of starting a business is positive in 
general, but stronger, in particular, for people at the lower end of wealth distribution.
Unsurprisingly, a $10,000 increase of assets means more to the poor would-be 
entrepreneurs than to the rich.
The conclusion is that although it is possible that the effect of wealth on the probability of 
becoming self-employed is not constant over the whole distribution of wealth, this 
nonlinear relationship does not seem to be prominent in this Korean data set. Meanwhile, 
a likelihood ratio test also does not reject the specification in which wealth enters linearly 
(p-value .12).
In this paper, I make a slight change of specification (1) by using the logarithm of wealth. 
By focusing on the effect of one percent change in household assets on the probability of 
starting a business, this specification provides the convenience to make cross-country 
comparisons.
1.3.2 Wage Earnings
Prior self-employment earnings in the wage-employment sector are usually considered as 
an important determinant of self-employment. Table 1.4 shows a negative relationship 
between previous wage earnings and entry into self-employment, which supports the 
common notion that people with lower earnings are more likely to choose self- 
employment because of lower opportunity costs (Georgellis, Sessions, and Tsitsianis 
2005).
Of course, interpretation of the wage effect is complicated by its correlation with 
unobserved ability. Several studies have shown that self-employment is made up of 
workers with the lowest or highest ability (Ohyama 2007; Astebro, Chen, and Thompson 
2008). The former are pushed into self-employment because their poor performance 
limits their job opportunities in the wage sector, while the latter are attracted to self-
employment because of its higher returns. In this sense, if the wage is positively related 
to workers' ability, we would expect to see both high-wage and low-wage workers 
switching from wage sector to self-employment. Which group accounts for the larger 
proportion depends on the specific data sample. Furthermore, if ability is also considered 
as being transferable across sectors, low-wage workers would be less likely to become 
self-employed since they cannot expect to do better in self-employment.
T a b l e  1.4
Comparing Linear and N onlinear Specifications for Wealth
D e p t . V a r : P r o b . b e c o m i n g  s e l f -
e m p l o y e d
(1) (2)
La g g e d  A s s e t s /1 0 0 0 0 .0 1 * * * 0 .0 2 * *
(4 .2 6 ) (2 .9 7 )
(L a g g e d  A s s e t s /1 0 0 0 ) 2 . . . -5 .2 8 e -0 5
W a g e / 1000 -1 .5 6 * *
(-1 .5 1 )
-1 .6 5 * *
(-2 .6 5 ) ( -2 .7 3 )
A ge -0 .01* -0 .0 1 * *
(-1 .7 3 ) ( -2 .0 3 )
M a r r i e d 0 .05 0.03
(0 .3 2 ) (0 .1 9 )
M al e 0 .2 5 * * 0 .2 6 * *
(2 .3 7 ) (2 .4 2 )
COLG 0 .0 4 0.03
(0 .4 1 ) (0 .2 7 )
M a r g i n a l  E ff ec ts  O f A s s e t s 0 .0 0 0 3 * * 0 .0 0 0 5 * *
(4 .0 3 ) (3 .0 6 )
O b s . 6 ,3 5 5 6 ,3 5 5
In this and subsequent tables, number o f  observations varies as a result o f  m issing  
data on selected regressors. S ignificance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1.
To partly address this endogeneity issue regarding unobserved innate ability, I replace the 
level of wage with its growth rate in the model for two reasons. First, workers care about 
the prospect of their income more than their current earnings. Anticipating a further 
decrease of their wage income in the future is more likely to make them consider self­
employment. More important, the negative growth of wage can often be attributed to an 
exogenous shock instead of a worker’s own ability. Thus, workers who are experiencing 
decreasing wage earnings could expect to earn more in self-employment. Thus, I expect a 
negative relationship between the growth of wage and the probability of entry into self- 
employment. Using the growth rate of wage growth is certainly not a perfect way to solve 
the endogeneity problem. But it alleviates the severity of this issue.
1.3.3 Education
The trouble with educational attainment is that it is closely related to several other 
covariates, such as earnings and occupation. However, Georgellis, Sessions, and 
Tsitsianis (2005) show that after controlling for these variables, previous longitudinal 
studies show no significant effect of formal education on the probability of becoming 
self-employed.
Educational attainment is also correlated with wealth. This correlation arises in two ways. 
First, highly-educated people are better at accumulating wealth. Second, even at the same 
level of wealth, highly-educated people may have easier access to external finance 
because of better credibility, networks, or perceptions of potential financiers about the 
chances for success. Thus, there is a possibility that highly-educated entrepreneurs face 
fewer liquidity constraints compared to their less-educated counterparts. This difference, 
however, is neglected if education is added to the regression as a control variable, in 
which case the slope on wealth is forced to be the same for both educated and uneducated 
groups. The issue that wealth may affect entrepreneurial entry distinctively for college- 
educated and non college-educated people becomes even more substantial in the present 
Korean data, simply because the relationship between wealth and being the eldest son in
Korea is likely to be negative if the son had a college education and positive if he did not, 
as previously discussed. Although it is so far a hypothetical argument, I will show later 
how the data support this hypothesis. To distinguish these two cases, I drop the variable 
of education from all regression models in the following analysis. Instead, I split the 
sample into two sub-samples: one of observations with college education and the other 
without. Each regression is then estimated separately on each sub-sample.
1.3.4 A Modified Baseline Specification 
My modified baseline specification is
selfe,, = f 0+ f  ln(a„ _,) + /?,pgwu , + X'n f  + £„ , (2)
where selfe, is still a binary variable that takes the value one if individual i switches from 
wage-employment to self-employment, and zero if otherwise; ln(tf,) is the logarithm of 
net assets in the previous year; pgw, is the growth rate of monthly wage in the previous 
year for individual z; and X, is a vector of demographic variables including age, gender, 
and marital status. At this stage, I do not control for occupation and industry. This 
experiment is left to the robustness check at the end of the analysis.
Table 1.5 reports the estimated effect of net assets on the probability of becoming self- 
employed in the modified baseline probit regression (2). Column (1) shows that in the 
non college-educated sample, there is a positive relationship between the odds of 
becoming self-employed and the amount of assets prior to the transition into self- 
employment. The coefficient on the variable of interest, lagged log assets, indicates that a 
ten percent increase in assets raises the probability of becoming self-employed by two 
percent. The result is significant at ten percent level. In column (2), the college-educated 
sample, the estimated coefficient on lagged log assets is positive, but it is much smaller
and not significantly different from zero. Thus, the effect of assets appears to be stronger 
for the non college-educated people than their college-educated counterpart. The 
estimated results on other covariates suggest that men are more likely to switch from 
wage employment to self-employment; while people who are married or older are less 
likely to make this transition. Moreover, people are more likely to become self-employed 
when they experience declining earnings in the wage-employment sector. While the signs 
are consistent with intuition, none of these effects is statistically significant.
T a b l e  1.5
Probability- o f  B ecom ing Self-Em ployed: Probit R egressions
D e p t . V a r =1 IF s w it c h e d  in t o  s e l f - 
e m p l o y m e n t  IN CURRENT YEAR.
(1 )  (2 )
No C o l l e g e  C o l l e g e
L a g g e d  Lo g  A s s e t s 0 .0 9 * 0.01
(1 .7 6 ) (0 .2 5 )
G r o w t h  O f M o n t h l y  W a g e  In
-0 .04 -0 .45
P r e v i o u s  Y e a r
( -0 .2 6 ) ( -1 .4 9 )
A ge -0.01 -0.01
( -0 .7 8 ) ( -0 .8 0 )
M a r r i e d -0 .32 . . .
M a l e
( -1 .5 5 )
0 .0 7 0 .1 9
(0 .4 3 ) (0 .7 6 )
A v .  Lo g  L i k e l ih o o d -0 .0 6 -0 .08
P s e u d o  R2 0 .02 0 .0 2
O b s . 2 ,6 0 5 1,387
Z-scores are in parentheses. S ignificance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10. Variable M ARRIED  
is dropped from the regression in column (2) because M A RR IED=0 predicts self-em ploym ent 
perfectly.
The main concern with these regressions is of course the expected positive correlation 
between assets and unobserved entrepreneurial ability. It is worth noting that this 
unobserved ability is not equivalent to formal education, and it is entirely possible that 
people with the same level of education differ in unobserved abilities. I turn now to IV
estimations, using birth order as an instrument. The next section begins with a 
justification for using this instrument in the Korean data.
1.4 The Hypothesis and Cultural Background
We don’t have much to give, but the house will go to our eldest son. This is for 
two reasons. First our house was bought with some help from him. He deserves 
a share because of this. Second, my eldest son went through many difficult times 
looking after his younger brothers and sisters. We wanted them to go to school 
in Chonju so my first son and his wife took them into his house and cared for 
them there.
Prendergast (2005: 160)
This conversation comes from an interview of a Korean woman, who was asked about 
her plans for dividing the family’s house and property. Her reply characterizes the basic 
role that the Korean society has defined for the son, especially the eldest son. In the old 
days, the social expectation for the eldest son was to take care of parents in their old age, 
help the family’s welfare, and support younger siblings. In return, the eldest son would 
receive the lion’s share of any inheritance. According to pre-1962 legal code, the amount 
of inheritance the eldest son should receive was twice the amount received by other 
younger sons. Sorensen (1986) and Prendergast (2005) report that it was customary for 
the eldest son to receive at least half the estate regardless of the number of other sons. 
Married daughters were usually excluded from the division altogether.
This traditional inheritance system has been notionally weakened since legal changes in 
1990 stipulating that all successors have equal shares of an inheritance regardless of sex 
or marital status. However, Sorensen (1986) and Yang (1998) note that the influence of 
patriarchal rules and obligations for sons continues through either traditions in Family 
Law or belief in the “moral value of filial piety”. In Prendergast’s (2005) survey of fifty
elderly men in southwest Korea, almost half of the respondents preferred the eldest son to 
receive the largest share of inheritance. Prendergast (2005) also found that elderly people 
find a number of ways to avoid strictly following the equal inheritance rule. One of the 
avenues is through article 1008-2 of the Civil Code, which states that if a person has 
made a special contribution to family property, this contributory portion should be 
considered as his inherited portion and should be added to the amount he is supposed to 
inherit from the rest of the property. Because this clause tends to compensate those (often 
sons), who remain with parents and provide them with financial support, parents have 
considerable latitude to pass more property to their sons. Another common way to 
circumvent the law is through a family meeting, in which the parents declare their wishes 
to transmit property to specific recipients (such as the eldest son) before all family 
members. But the most important way to circumvent the inheritance law is to transmit 
property prior to death. In fact, because of this practice, many Korean parents also count 
dowries and other wedding expenses, investments in education, or donations for setting 
up businesses, as part of their pre-mortem transfer of property. In practice, this has 
provided justification for providing daughters little of the inheritance. At the end of his 
field study, Prendergast (2005) concludes that in modem Korea, sons, especially eldest 
sons, remain highly favored in parents’ decisions about the distribution of family wealth. 
As the distribution of family wealth can be either prior to death or through bequests, it 
seems that being the eldest son in South Korea should be positively related to a person’s 
wealth. However, this relationship may be rather complicated when parents are still alive. 
As mentioned above, the eldest son has the obligation of caring for elderly parents and 
for providing support to other siblings. Married daughters are also expected to contribute
to their natal family, but the amounts and frequencies of money provided by them are 
typically far less than those provided by their brothers. From this perspective, the eldest 
son has the greatest financial burden of caring parents and siblings, though he is 
ultimately rewarded more as well. As a result, the net effect of being an eldest son on 
wealth becomes a purely empirical question.
As education frequently is counted as part of the pre-mortem transfer made to children, I 
conjecture that net financial transfers from the eldest son to his parents are greater for the 
college educated. During each wave’s interview, respondents were asked about financial 
support they gave or received from parents in the previous year. The numbers reported do 
not include real estate transfers or post-mortem inheritances. Based on the respondents’ 
answers, I calculate the net financial support, which is the difference between the amount 
of support respondents provided to their parents and the amount they received from 
parents. The mean of this difference in the college-educated sub-sample is 960,000 KW, 
which is, as expected, more than twice the mean in the non college-educated sub-sample. 
Moreover, the net amount provided by the eldest sons with college education is markedly 
higher at the 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles.
Table 1.6 reports the results from regressing the net financial support on a series of 
demographic variables. The coefficient for the variable, eldest, is positive and significant, 
indicating that the eldest son, in general, provides more financial support to parents than 
other siblings. This relationship is even stronger for the eldest sons who had college 
education, as shown in columns (2) and (3). The results are consistent with the conjecture 
that the effect of being the eldest son on wealth may differ at these two educational levels.
To summarize, although the eldest sons often dominate the “wealth transmission” system, 
they are also the main provider of income to aged parents. This burden is even larger if 
the eldest son is wealthier or better educated, in which case his share of wealth transfer 
from parents might also be largely reduced. Hence, the hypothesis is that the relationship 
between wealth and being the eldest son in South Korea is negative if the son is college 
educated, and positive if he is not.
T a b l e  1.6
The Effect o f  Being the Eldest Son on N et Cash Transfer
D e p t . V a r : N e t  In c o m e  T r a n s f e r  t o  P a r e n t s
A l l  In d i v i d u a l s N o n - C o l l e g e  E d u c a t e d C o l l e g e  E d u c a t e d
m a l e -3 4 .7 7 * * -7 .4 9 -7 0 .9 7 *
(-2 .1 3 ) ( -0 .8 7 ) ( -1 .7 0 )
A g e 0 .4 4 -0 .0 7 -0 .32
(0 .6 5 ) ( -0 .2 1 ) ( -0 .1 7 )
M a r r i e d -1 .4 4 -3 .9 7 7 .74
(-0 .0 7 ) ( -0 .3 9 ) (0 .1 4 )
E l d e s t 3 9 .9 2 * * * 2 0 .2 5 * * * 74 .9 3 * *
(2 .6 7 ) (2 .4 6 ) (2 .0 9 )
N o .  o f  S i b l i n g s 5 .79* 1.61 13.63
(1 .6 1 ) (0 .8 7 ) (1 .4 1 )
L a g g e d  L o g  W a g e 5 4 .6 4 * * * 2 4 .6 2 * * * 108 .58***
(4 .8 9 ) (4 .1 5 ) (3 .5 4 )
COLG 23 .2 * — . . .
(1 .6 6 )
O b s . 4 ,8 5 2 2 ,9 9 5 1,857
t-statistics are in parentheses. S ignificance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.
1.5 Self-Employment and Wealth Constraints: IV Results
In the 6th wave of the KLIPS, respondents were asked the following two questions:
• Do you have either brothers or sisters? a. Number of total brothers, b. Number 
of total sisters, c. Birth order.
• Do you have older brothers or sisters? a. Number of older brothers, b. Number 
of older sisters.
estimated coefficients on eldest are not significantly different from zero, which relieves 
this concern.
The main advantage of using birth order as the instrument for wealth is its little 
correlation with any family or social factors. Nonetheless, one may argue that the chance 
of being the eldest son decreases with the number of siblings, while family size is 
commonly considered as a reflection of parents’ education and household wealth. 
Consequently, a critical question is whether the size of siblings could invalidate the 
current instrument, eldest, through an indirect correlation with household wealth, and 
then further bias the estimated result. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.7 show that the 
estimated coefficient on the variable of sibling number is not statistically significant, 
indicating that sibling size is not an omitted variable. This result excludes the possibility 
that the instrument is correlated with a relevant variable omitted from the regression.
T a b l e  1.7 
Testing for Omitted Variables
D e p . V a r : =  1 if B e c o m i n g  S el f -E m p l o y e d  in C u r r e n t  Y ea r
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No C o l l e g e C o l l e g e No C o l l e g e  C o l l e g e
La g g e d  Lo g  A s s e t s
0 .1 3 * *
(2 .1 1 )
0 .03
(0 .4 2 )
0 .1 3 * *
(2 .1 9 )
0 .0 4
(0 .6 5 )
E l d e s t  S o n =1
-0 .02
(-0 .0 8 )
-0 .0 8
( -0 .4 2 )
-- --
No. O f S i b l i n g s -- -- -0 .05
(-1 .1 1 )
-0 .1 0
( -1 .5 4 )
W a g e  G r o w t h  In -0 .23 -0 .55 -0 .2 2 -0 .55
Pr e v i o u s  Y e a r ( -0 .9 3 ) ( -1 .5 8 ) (-0 .9 1 ) ( -1 .5 8 )
A ge
0 .0 0 2 -0.01 0.00 0.00
( -0 .1 8 ) ( -0 .6 7 ) (0 .0 3 ) ( -0 .2 2 )
M a r r i e d
-0 .4 8 * *
(-2 .2 0 )
-- - 0 .4 8 * *
( -2 .2 0 )
---
M ale
0.01 0 .5 8 0.00 0.53
(0 .0 4 ) (1 .5 6 ) (0 .0 0 ) (1 .4 8 )
A v .  Lo g  L ik e l ih o o d -0 .0 6 -0 .08 -0 .0 6 -0 .08
P s e u d o  R 2 0 .0 4 0.03 0 .0 4 0 .05
O b s . 2 ,0 1 7 1,155 2 ,0 1 7 1,155
Z -scores  are in parentheses.  S ign if ican ce  levels: * * * 0 .0 1 ,  * * 0 .0 5 , *0.10.
Even so, the remaining concern is the implicit correlation between sibling size and 
unobserved ability, which may subsequently affect the validity of the instrument, eldest. 
This problem can be resolved by restricting the sample according to a certain sibling size, 
which is addressed in the later part of the analysis.
T a b l e  1.8 
Reduced-Form Probit R egressions
D e p . V a r : =  1 if B e c o m i n g  S e l f - E m p l o y e d  
in  C u r r e n t  Y e a r
(1)
No C o l l e g e
(2)
C o l l e g e
E l d e s t 0 .0 0 -0.09
(-0.01) (-0.46)
W a g e  G r o w t h  In  P r e v i o u s  Y e a r -0.25 -0.54
(-0.99) (-1.56)
A g e 0 .0 0 -0.01
(-0.01) (-0.55)
M a r r i e d -0.37 —
(-1.74)
M a l e 0.01 0.57
(0.03) (1.54)
O b s . 2,017 1,155
Z-scores are in parenthesis.
Murray (2006) suggests the use of reduced-form regressions to check the intuition behind 
an instrumental variable. Table 1.8 reports results from estimating the reduced-form 
regression in which the dependent variable is the probability of switching to self- 
employment, selfe, and the independent variables include the instrument, eldest, as well 
as all non-troublesome explanatory variables in the modified baseline equation (2). The 
estimated coefficient on eldest is not statistically significant in both college-educated and 
non college-educated sub-samples. According to Angrist and Krueger (2001), there are 
three possible implications based on this result: either the model is under-identified, or IV 
estimation is uninformative, or the troublesome variable, lagged log assets, does not 
matter for the likelihood of becoming self-employed {i.e., there are no liquidity
constraints).Under-identification should not be the case under the assumption that 
demographic variables (such as age, gender, and marital status) are not contemporarily 
correlated with the error term; the purpose of using the growth of monthly wage is also to 
avoid the endogeneity problem presented by wage levels. The question then pins down to 
whether or not the instrument, eldest, is relevant to wealth. If not, the instrument cannot 
properly serve the purpose of the analysis and IV estimation is uninformative; otherwise, 
the results in Table 1.8 offer a sign o f no liquidity constraints. To examine the relevance 
of the instrument, eldest, I report in Table 1.9 the first stage regression estimates. It is not 
surprising to see in all three columns that household wealth is positively related to wage 
growth, age, and marriage. Column (1) shows no significant effect on wealth of the 
instrument, eldest, when controlling for college education. However, when splitting the 
sample by college education, I find opposite relationships between wealth and being the 
eldest son in the two sub-samples. In the non college-educated group (column 2), being 
the eldest son increases the household assets by 14 percent. By contrast, in the college- 
educated group (column 3), being the eldest son reduces the household assets by 19 
percent. Both results are significant at around the five percent level. Thus, I am confident 
that the variable, eldest, is an informative instrument for wealth for this data set. Also, the 
results again substantiate the previous hypothesis that the effect of being the eldest son on 
wealth differs between the college-educated group and the non college- educated group. 
This provides a foundation for the strategy of carrying out the analysis separately in these 
two groups.
It is worth mentioning that there are very few observations in the data set that report 
living with parents. Recall from the overview of Korean culture, the distribution of
property is strongly associated with the responsibility of caring elderly parents. In other 
words, a child other than the eldest son can receive a significant amount of bequest for 
living with and taking care of parents. In this case, living with parents might be an 
important explanatory variable that should be included in the regression. But this should 
not be case in the present data set, for there are at most 0.5 percent of respondents who 
reported living with parents during each wave of the interview.
T a b l e  1.9
_____________________ Testing for Relevant Instrument: OLS R egressions_____________________
D e p t . V a r : Lo g  L a g g e d  A s s e t s
(1 )  (2)
A l l  N o  C o l l e g e
(3)
C o l l e g e
E l d e s t -0 . 0 1 0 .1 4 * -0 .1 9 * *
( -0 .1 8 ) ( 1 .8 6 ) ( -2 .1 4 )
W a g e  G r o w t h  In  P r e v i o u s  
Y e a r
0 . 1 2 ** 0 . 1 0 ** 0 .19**
(2 .8 5 ) (2 .0 8 ) (2 .2 5 )
A g e q 0 3 *** 0 .0 1 *** 0 .0 7 * * *
( 1 1 .2 9 ) (3 .6 7 ) (1 4 .4 0 )
M a r r i e d 0 .8 0 * * * 0 .8 3 * * * 0 .6 3 * * *
(9 .1 6 ) (7 .8 4 ) (4 .1 1 )
M a l e -0 .0 6 -0 .0 4 -0 .2 3 * *
(-0 .8 8 ) ( -0 .5 1 ) (-2 .1 6 )
COLG 0 .6 9 * * *
(1 2 .7 8 )
- -
A d j u s t e d  R2 0 . 1 0 0 .0 4 0 .1 7
O b s . 3 ,2 6 7 2 ,0 1 7 1,250
/-statistics are in parenthesis. S ignificance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.
1.5.2 IV  Estimates
After establishing the validity and relevance of the instrument, eldest, we are ready to 
look at the results from the IV regressions presented in Table 1.10. Columns (1) and (2) 
show that the estimated coefficients on wealth— instrumented with the variable of being 
the eldest son— are positive in both the college-educated and the non college-educated 
sub-samples, but the estimates are not statistically significant. Wage earning is the only
employment-related variable that has been controlled for in all the regressions so far. But 
wealth effects may also vary across occupations: First, entry into self-employment in 
certain fields (such as lawyer, doctor, and salesperson) likely requires less capital; second,
T a b l e  1 . 1 0  
IV Probit R egressions
D e p . V a r : =  1 if B e c o m i n g  S e l f - E m p l o y e d  i n  C u r r e n t  Y e a r
( 1) (2 )
No C o l l e g e C o l l e g e
L a g g e d  L o g  A s s e t s 0.02 0 . 4 0
(0 .01 ) ( 0 . 6 3 )
W a g e  G r o w t h  In  P r e v i o u s  
Y e a r
-0.21 - 0 . 5 4
( - 0 . 6 7 ) ( - 1 . 5 3 )
A g e 0.00 - 0 . 0 3
( -0 .01 ) ( - 0 . 8 1 )
M a r r i e d - 0 . 3 9  ^^  '-y
( - 0 . 3 0 ) (0 .00 )
M a l e 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 5 8 *
(0 .02 ) ( 1 . 7 7 )
A v .  L o g  L i k e l i h o o d - 1 . 8 5 - 1 . 8 2
O b s . 2 , 0 1 7 1 , 2 5 0
Z-scores are in parenthesis.
a person’s previous occupation is also, to some extent, related to the type of business he 
would start, which in turn determines different requirement for initial capital. On the 
basis of this consideration, I report in Table 1.11 the results from the IV estimation after 
adding controls for individuals’ previous occupations. The correlation between household 
net wealth and the instrument, eldest, remains strong in the first-stage regression. As 
shown before, this correlation is positive in the non college-educated sub-sample and 
negative in the college-educated sub-sample. The IV estimation, again, shows no 
significant wealth effect on the probability of becoming self-employed. Before drawing 
the conclusion that there are no liquidity constraints in South Korea, we should return to 
the issue of sibling counts. As discussed before, the probability of being the eldest son
increases if the person has fewer siblings. As the number of children is commonly 
believed to be negatively related to parents’ education, eldest is possibly correlated with
T a b l e  1 .11
IV Probit R egressions (Controlling for Previous Occupations)
D e p .  V a r :  =  1 i f  B e c o m i n g  S e l f - E m p l o y e d  in  
C u r r e n t  Y e a r
( 0
N o  C o l l e g e
(2 )
C o l l e g e
L a g g e d  L o g  A s s e t s -0 .25 0.41
(-0 .2 3 ) (0 .5 7 )
W a g e  G r o w t h  In  P r e v i o u s  Y e a r -0 .1 7 -0 .53
(-0 .4 6 ) ( -1 .3 8 )
A g e 0 . 0 1 -0 .0 4
(0 .3 8 ) ( -1 .0 7 )
M a r r i e d -0 .1 9 3 .18
(-0 .1 5 ) (0 .0 0 )
M a l e -0 .03 0.61
(-0 .1 3 ) (1 .7 1 )
A v .  L o g  L i k e l i h o o d -1 .83 -1 .81
F i r s t  S t a g e  E s t i m a t e s
N o  C o l l e g e C o l l e g e
E l d e s t 0 .1 3 * -0 .1 6 *
(1 .7 4 ) ( -1 .8 3 )
W a g e  G r o w t h  In  P r e v i o u s  Y e a r 0 . 1 0 ** 0 .1 8 * *
(2 .0 7 ) (2 .2 0 )
A g e 0 .0 2 *** 0 .0 6 * * *
(4 .1 8 ) (1 3 .1 2 )
M a r r i e d 0 .8 0 * * * 0 .6 0 * * *
(7 .6 0 ) (3 .9 1 )
M a l e 0 .03 -0 .2 6 * *
(0 .3 1 ) ( -2 .2 3 )
O b s . 2 ,0 1 7 1,250
Z-scores are in parenthesis for IV estimation, and /-statistics are in parenthesis for first stage 
estimation. S ignificance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.
unobserved ability through this avenue. Furthermore, if a family has too many children, 
we would expect the wealth inherited by, or transferred to, each child (even the eldest son) 
to be too small to have a significant effect on the child’s own assets. From this
perspective, having a large number of siblings may weaken the explanatory power of the 
instrument.
Although the number of siblings ranges between zero and sixteen, fifty-seven percent of 
the sample report having three to five. To maintain the validity of the instrument, my 
initial strategy is to restrict the sample to the 6,220 observations with three to five 
siblings and leave out those with too few or too many siblings. But there exists another 
problem that is noteworthy. Recall when the data set was constructed, both household 
heads and their spouses are included in the sample. The couple shares observations on 
household assets (from household data), but each partner has his or her own observations 
on work status and number of siblings. The instrument, eldest, is one if a male respondent 
was the eldest son; it is zero if a person was not the eldest son, which includes the case of 
being a female respondent. Imagine there is a female respondent whose husband was the 
eldest son. Since the husband and the wife share the same household assets, the effect of 
being the wife o f the eldest son should be identical to the effect o f being the eldest son on 
household assets. However, because the variable, eldest, is coded as zero for the wife, I 
am not able to capture the effect on assets of being the wife of the eldest son. In fact, 
there are 408 households of this kind in the 6th wave data set, where the variable, eldest, 
was initially constructed.
The easiest solution to this problem is to restrict the sample to males. A more 
sophisticated way is to identify each woman in the data whose husband was the eldest 
son, and then recode the variable, eldest, as one on these observations. The latter strategy 
allows me to include more valuable observations in the regressions. I report results from 
both strategies here.
1.5.3 Estimation from Males Alone
Table 1.12 presents the result from restricting the sample to the male who had three to 
five siblings. First-stage estimates show that restricting the sample by sibling size 
increases the effect on wealth of being the eldest in the uneducated sub-sample. In the 
new restricted sample, being the eldest son increases household assets by 28 percent, 
compared to 14 percent in the unrestricted sample. The result is significant at the one 
percent level.
In the restricted educated sub-sample, the result shows that being the eldest son reduces 
household assets by 20 percent, which is similar to the 19 percent negative effect found in 
the unrestricted sample. More important, IV estimation shows in both sub-samples that an 
increase in household assets raises the chance of becoming self-employed, providing a 
significant evidence of liquidity constraints.
It is worth noting that for the college-educated group the baseline probit regression 
predicts no significant correlation between wealth and the probability of becoming self- 
employed, but the IV estimation shows a positive and significant effect of wealth on self- 
employment. This disparity arises for two possible reasons. The first possibility is that 
among people with a college degree, those with low ability ones are more likely to 
become self-employed because of low-quality job-matching in the wage sector. As 
wealth is positively related to unobserved ability, we cannot see any positive relationship 
between wealth and the odds of becoming self-employed without controlling for 
unobserved ability in the measure of wealth. This may not be a general case, but in the 
current Korean data set, nearly half of the observations on college-educated business
D e p . V a r : =  1 if B e c o m i n g  S e l f - E m p l o y e d  i n  C u r r e n t  
Y e a r
(1) (2)
N o  C o l l e g e  C o l l e g e
L a g g e d  L o g  A s s e t s 0 .6 3 * * 0 .6 4 * * *
(2 .1 3 ) (3 .8 0 )
W a g e  G r o w t h  In  P r e v i o u s -0 .6 0 -0 .38
Y e a r
( -1 .1 7 ) ( -1 .3 1 )
A g e -0 .0 3 * * -0 .0 3 * *
(-2 .2 6 ) (-2 .2 1 )
M a r r i e d -0 .52 1.45
(-1 .3 6 ) ( 0 .0 0 )
A v .  L o g  L i k e l i h o o d - 1 . 8 -1 .7 8
F i r s t  S t a g e  E s t i m a t e s
N o  C o l l e g e C o l l e g e
E l d e s t 0 .2 8 * * * -0 .2 0 *
(2 .8 5 ) ( -1 .8 9 )
W a g e  G r o w t h  In  P r e v i o u s 0 .0 9 0.15
Y e a r
(1 .3 9 ) (1 .2 4 )
A g e 0 .0 3 * * * 0 .0 6 * * *
(6 .2 3 ) (8 .5 6 )
M a r r i e d q 5 9 *** 0 .6 4 * * *
(4 .0 6 ) (2 .8 4 )
B a s e l i n e  P r o b i t  R e g r e s s i o n s
( 1 ) (2 )
N o  C o l l e g e C o l l e g e
L a g g e d  L o g  A s s e t s 0 .2 0 * -0 .0 7
(1 .8 5 ) ( -0 .8 4 )
A v .  L o g  L i k e l i h o o d -0 .05 -0 . 1
O b s . 86 4 563
Z-scores are in parenthesis for IV and baseline estim ations, and /-statistics are in parenthesis for 
the first stage estim ation. S ignificance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.
owners were engaged in wholesale and retail business or manufacturing sector. This 
business distribution is very similar to that observed among non college-educated self­
employers. Normally, we would expect a much sharper difference in the fields where 
these two groups started their businesses, considering their distinct skill sets.
The second possibility, as suggested in Nanda (2008), is that individuals who are wealthy 
but have no college education represent the majority of self-employed workers in the data 
set. If this is the case, a positive and significant relationship between wealth and self- 
employment entry may not be found in the baseline regression for the college-educated 
group. However, this explanation does not seem to be plausible in the present data set. A 
comparative analysis (results not shown here) suggests that, among people who switched 
to self-employment, pre-entry assets of college-educated workers are on average three 
times larger than those of workers without college degree. After adjusting for the 
percentage of each group among all the transitions, I still find that college-educated self­
employers were twice wealthier than the non college-educated prior to the transition.
1.5.4 Estimation Including Wives o f  Eldest Sons
Table 1.13 reports the results from the second strategy. The sample consists of all male 
respondents who had three to five siblings, as well as their spouses if there are 
observations. The first-stage regressions consistently show the same positive (negative) 
correlation between wealth and being the eldest son in the non college-educated (college- 
educated) subsample. IV estimations indicate that liquidity constraints exist in both 
subsamples. All the results are highly significant at the one percent level.
1.6 Conclusions
If a person considers starting a business but has little access to external loans, he has to 
rely on his own assets at least to meet the initial requirement of capital. The wealthier he 
is, the more likely he would become self-employed. Thus, a positive effect of household 
assets on the probability of becoming self-employed can serve as evidence of liquidity
D e p . V a r : =  1 if B e c o m i n g  S e l f - E m p l o y e d  in  C u r r e n t  
Y e a r
(1) (2)
No C o l l e g e  C o l l e g e
L a g g e d  L o g  A s s e t s 0.72*** 0.65***
(4.96) (4 .69)
W a g e  G r o w t h  In  P r e v i o u s  Y e a r -0.48 -0.39
(-1 .19) (-1 .52)
A g e -0 .03*** -0.04***
(-2 .89) (-3 .23)
M a r r i e d -0 .60** 1.43
(-2 .08) (0 .00)
M a l e 0.24 0.41**
(0 .88) (1 .93)
A v .  L o g  L i k e l i h o o d -1 .77 -1.77
L i r s t  S t a g e  E s t i m a t e s
N o  C o l l e g e C o l l e g e
E l d e s t 0.24*** -0.24***
(2.77) (-2 .39)
W a g e  G r o w t h  In  P r e v i o u s  Y e a r 0.09 0.18
(1 .58) (1 .51)
A g e 0.03*** 0.07***
(6.60) (10 .05)
M a r r i e d 0.70*** 0.60***
(4.22) (2 .70)
M a l e -0 .07 -0.42***
(-0 .65) (-3 .00)
B a s e l i n e  P r o b i t  R e g r e s s i o n s
No C o l l e g e C o l l e g e
L a g g e d  L o g  A s s e t s 0.23** -0.06
(2 .22) (-0 .74)
A v .  L o g  L i k e l i h o o d -0.05 -0.09
O b s . 1,062 673
Z-scores are in parenthesis for IV and baseline estim ations, and /-statistics are in parenthesis for the first 
stage estim ation. S ignificance levels: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.
constraints in entrepreneurship. The idea is straightforward, but the analysis becomes 
complicated because of the endogeneity problem caused by the correlation between 
wealth and unobserved ability. Moreover, finding an instrument for wealth that is
unrelated to any factor that might stimulate entrepreneurship is also a challenge. This 
paper proposes an instrument different from those used in previous studies, a son’s birth 
order, to test the existence of liquidity constraints faced by entrepreneurs in South Korea. 
Two prominent features of Korea culture, male-dominance and fidelity, determine a 
strong relationship between birth order and wealth. Eldest sons are more likely to receive 
larger wealth transferred from parents either through bequests or pre-mortem in-kind 
transfers. Pre-mortem, they are also supposed to provide more financial support to 
parents than are other siblings. Hence, the net effect of being the eldest son on his 
household wealth is ambiguous. The data show a positive effect for the eldest sons 
without college education, and a negative effect for those with college education.
The merit o f this instrument is that it is unlikely to be correlated with any family-specific 
variables, except that the probability of being the eldest is higher in a family with fewer 
children. Without controlling for sibling size in the IV estimation, I do not find any 
significant wealth effect on the probability of becoming self-employed. After restricting 
the sample to observations with three to five siblings, I find significantly positive wealth 
effect on entry into self-employment in both college-educated and non college-educated 
sub samples. The results provide strong evidence on liquidity constraints.
It is reasonable to question whether the eldest sons, rather than the first-born child, 
possess some special characteristics as they grew up under different expectations. For 
example, parents may intentionally make more investment in the eldest son’s education, 
teach him to be more responsible, or develop his ambition for achievement. It is also 
possible that being the eldest son in a primogenitary culture is associated with certain 
personal characteristics that do not always apply to eldest sons in other cultures. All these
thoughts point out the limitation of this instrument and raise new challenges for the future 
work. The plausibility of the correlation between being the eldest son in South Korean 
culture and the development of certain personal traits may need further exploration. More 
evidence is also needed to demonstrate the impact of these characteristics on 
entrepreneurial entry.
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CHAPTER 2 
Selection and Serial Entrepreneurs
2.1 Introduction
What motivates some individuals to become serial entrepreneurs, and how does this 
influence their performance? Is serial entrepreneurship driven by taste or personal 
accidents of history, or are there more systematic predictors? Do agents become serial 
entrepreneurs because their prior business failed, or because their prior business was a 
success? Despite an emerging literature on serial entrepreneurship we continue to have 
little confidence in our answers to these questions.
Early work, largely based on small-sample interviews with serial entrepreneurs, suggest 
they are motivated by a variety o f factors. Wright, Robbie, and Ennew (1997), for 
example, identify half a dozen disparate motivations. Prominent among them, some start 
a new venture because they want to explore new business opportunities, while others are 
attempting to rebuild a failed business. Williams (2000) also identified disparate 
motivations. While some interviewees were motivated by a desire to seize timely 
opportunities, Williams also documents instances in which serial entrepreneurs enjoy 
starting businesses because they can relate the products to their personal experiences.4 
More recent work has exploited larger samples, focused on more objectively measurable 
attributes of serial entrepreneurs, and provided performance comparisons with first-time 
entrepreneurs (cf. Eesley and Roberts 2006a; Stam et al. 2006; Gompers et al. 2006). 
These studies have yielded the following evidence:
4 Jeff Jacober, for exam ple, started his first business when he was still in co llege, selling sportswear to 
fraternities and sororities. After his brother w as diagnosed with chronic kidney failure, Jacober found 
Ocean D iagnostic Inc. w hich produced a home health test that helped people to self-diagnose various 
diseases.
• Serial entrepreneurs are more likely to have successfully sold their prior 
ventures before starting a new business (Eesley et al. 2006b; Stam et al. 2006).
• The current firm has a higher chance of going public if the entrepreneur’s 
previous venture was acquired (Eesley et al. 2006a).
• Entrepreneurs whose business performs poorly are less likely to create a new 
business (Stam et al. 2006).
• Entrepreneurs who succeeded in prior business have a much higher chance of 
succeeding in the current business, compared to first-time entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurs who previously failed (Gompers et al. 2006).
These findings are consistent with at least two distinct interpretations. Eesley and Roberts 
(2006a), and Stam et al. (2006) interpret their results as evidence that learning from prior 
founding experience has a positive impact on serial entrepreneurial performance. In 
contrast, Gompers et al. (2006) conclude that self-selection based on innate 
entrepreneurial skill, rather than learning by doing matters most for serial business 
formation and performance.
There is, o f course, an extensive theoretical literature on learning by doing (see 
Thompson 2008a for an extensive review), from which many of the insights are readily 
adaptable to entrepreneurship. Indeed, there is already an emerging literature that focuses 
on issues such as how serial entrepreneurs learn from their successful or unsuccessful 
prior experiences (Minniti and Bygrave 2001), or how experiential learning positively or 
negatively affects their entrepreneurial performance (Politis 2005; Corbett 2005; Pastor, 
Taylor, and Veronesi 2009).
In contrast, there has been little theoretical work on the role of innate ability among serial 
entrepreneurs. Among the very few contributions, Holmes and Schmitz’ (1990) seminal 
theory of business transfer focuses on serial entrepreneurs who have a comparative 
advantage in developing new businesses. In their theory, people differ in their ability to 
respond to business opportunities. Thus, high-ability people become entrepreneurs, 
specializing in forming new businesses, the low-ability concentrate on managing existing 
businesses, and those in the middle are “jacks-of-all-trades”. To pursue new business 
opportunities, entrepreneurs need to free up their resources, such as time, through 
discontinuing or selling their previously developed businesses to their low- or middle- 
ability counterparts. In their model, an essential assumption is that individuals can 
perfectly observe their abilities. Then, serial entrepreneurship serves as a natural avenue 
for them to allocate their talents to the best use.
The present paper also develops a framework that formalizes serial entrepreneurial 
behavior based on selection on ability. I follow Holmes and Schmitz (1990) by assuming 
that business performance is jointly determined by an entrepreneur’s time-invariant 
ability and the quality of his business idea. I also assume these two determinants of 
performance are statistically independent. However, in the spirit of Jovanovic (1979, 
1982), the entrepreneur does not perfectly observe his ability and the quality of the 
business idea ex ante, but only has some prior beliefs about them. Every period, he 
observes the earnings of his business, as well as the average earnings o f the same kind of 
businesses in the market. The latter is a signal of the value of his business idea. By 
comparing the performance of his business with other similar ventures, the entrepreneur 
gradually updates his belief about his entrepreneurial ability. Based on this belief, he
makes a choice between keeping the current business and leaving the business to explore 
a new idea.
Although misleading signals may induce mistakes on the part of entrepreneurs, the model 
predicts that high ability entrepreneurs are more likely to establish serial businesses. This 
result has two further implications. First, entrepreneurs with a successful experience in 
the last business have a higher probability of starting a new venture, as ability is 
positively related to business earnings. Second, the ability of serial entrepreneurs is 
stochastically higher than that of first-time entrepreneurs. This in turn indicates that the 
more founding experience an entrepreneur has, the higher is the probability of him 
forming a new business, and the better is the performance of his new venture.
These implications bring out the essential insight of the model, that selection on ability is 
sufficient to induce a positive correlation between entrepreneurial experience (measured 
by previous business earnings and founding experience) and serial business formation as 
well as its subsequent performance. As previously mentioned, there has been a debate in 
the empirical literature on whether the impact of prior experience on current 
entrepreneurial performance can be explained by learning by doing (Eesley and Roberts 
2006a) or should be attributed to entrepreneurial skills (Gompers et al. 2006). This paper 
provides a theoretical basis for the hypothesis of selection on ability.
Learning about one’s ability and learning about operating a business are of course not 
mutually exclusive phenomena, and we would like to understand more about their 
relative importance. From the empirical standpoint, it has always been a challenge to 
separate these two types of learning. Thompson (2008a) develops a simple framework 
incorporating both types of learning, and highlights the difficulty in distinguishing them
in empirical analysis. So far. two studies on learning by doing have attempted to do so: 
one is by Farber (1994), who focuses on differences in the hazards of job separation 
implied by the two models; the other is by Nagypal (2007), who looks at firm-specific 
price shocks and their distinctive impacts on employee turnover in the two learning 
models (See Thompson 2008a for a more detailed discussion). In this paper, I take 
alternative approaches of fixed effects and IV estimations to test the predictions of the 
selection-based model, and to distinguish selection from learning by doing.
The data come from the NLSY79. The distinctive feature of the NLSY79, which makes it 
an ideal data source for this study, is its focus on a young cohort that was first 
interviewed between the ages of 14 and 22. This allows me to trace these individuals’ 
employment history from their first job after graduation, thereby avoiding potential left- 
censoring problems. Starting in 1979, the survey was conducted annually through 1994 
and biennially afterwards. As information from the previous year is often needed in the 
present analysis, I focus on the period from 1980 to 1993. The sample includes 1,830 
individuals who were, on average, interviewed for 5.8 survey rounds and had been self- 
employed at least once during these years. In each year, serial entrepreneurs are identified 
from the respondents' self-employment records. Nearly 30 percent of them reported ever 
forming a serial business. Their entrepreneurial experience is characterized by two 
variables. One is previous business performance, measured by their earnings in the last 
business. The other is their founding experience, indicated by the number of businesses 
they had previously formed.
A simple examination of the likelihood that a former entrepreneur currently started a new 
business consistently demonstrates its positive correlation with entrepreneurial
experience. That is, entrepreneurs with higher earnings in the last business or with more 
founding experience are more likely to form a serial business. Clearly, this result can be 
explained by either selection on ability, or learning by doing, or even both. To explicitly 
separate these two effects, I first run a fixed-effects model to control for time-invariant 
ability, an essential element in the theoretical model. By fixing entrepreneurial ability, the 
two variables, previous business earnings and the number of previously-owned 
businesses, would only be proxies for learning by doing. Surprisingly, neither of these 
two variables has a positive effect on the likelihood of new business formation. This 
suggests that learning by doing is not the cause of the positive effect that entrepreneurial 
experience has on new business formation.
Perhaps a better way to investigate how selection on ability affects serial business 
formation and its performance is to find instrumental variables that are closely related to 
the two measures of business experience (i.e., previous business earnings and the number 
of previously-owned businesses), but that are not subject to learning by doing. I construct 
two variables, which record an entrepreneur’s earnings in his first business and his 
earnings in his first job, respectively. As mentioned above, the structure of the NLSY79 
survey allows me to precisely identify most respondents’ first jobs and especially their 
first businesses. As there was no previous working experience for learning to occur, both 
earnings variables are only related to a person’s ability, which, as predicted in the model, 
positively affects his earnings in subsequent businesses and the number of ventures he 
would ever form. Consistent with the results from the regular logit regressions, the IV 
estimations show that, not only do high-ability entrepreneurs (proxied by previous
business earnings and the number of previously-owned businesses) have a higher chance 
of starting a new business, they are also likely to earn more in the new venture.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, to my knowledge, this is the first 
paper that applies the notion of selection on ability to explain the origin of serial 
entrepreneurship, although similar ideas have long been formalized to model firm 
dynamics (Jovanovic 1982). Selection yields some implications for serial 
entrepreneurship that can easily be misconstrued as being the result of learning by doing, 
and therefore raises doubts about whether we have correctly interpreted some of the 
existing empirical evidence. Second, the paper offers a plausible way to empirically 
examine the mechanism through which entrepreneurial experience affects the likelihood 
that an entrepreneur starts a new business and his entrepreneurial performance. The 
results shed light on some long-debated questions, such as what exactly (serial) 
entrepreneurs learned from their experience, and whether learning really improves their 
entrepreneurial performance. Third, this paper focuses on a broad definition of 
entrepreneurs, i.e., self-employed workers. The model applies not only to serial 
entrepreneurs clustered in high-tech industries and likely to obtain venture capital 
funding, but also to those who were self-employed in various small businesses. 
Compared to previous empirical studies which usually use hand-collected data from a 
relatively small survey sample, the empirical findings in this paper relate to a much more 
representative group of young workers in the US. Thus, the results provide us with a 
better understanding of serial entrepreneurship from the perspective of individual 
occupational choice.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model in which entrepreneurs 
make a business choice based on the evolution of beliefs about their time-invariant 
abilities. In section 3, several implications in the model are tested using data from the 
NLSY79. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 The Model
(1) Technology
Agents start in the business sector as entrepreneurs, and their lifetime is infinite. An 
entrepreneur’s business earnings, q, are given by,
q =  a e b (1)
where a is his entrepreneurial ability, and b is the quality of his business idea. Neither a 
nor b is perfectly observable to the entrepreneur. Let F0 (b) denote a common prior belief 
about b, which is normal with mean b and variance o^. The prior belief about a , F0(a), is 
assumed to be diffuse.
Each period, an active entrepreneur observes q, which does not change over time. He also 
observes a signal of b, for example, from the average performance of this business idea in 
the market. The signal, s, is normally distributed with mean b and variance <rs2. Using 
Bayesian updating, the entrepreneur’s posterior belief about b in period t, Ft (b) ,  is 
normal with mean bt and variance <j^t , where bt =  (cr2b -f t5<r^)/(<72 + tcr^), a ^ t = 
o ^ o l l i p l  +  ttfb), and s = (Z U i s d / t -  The expectation of his ability at t, E,(a), is 
therefore given by
Ft (a) = Q f ^ e ~ bdFt (b) (2)
(2) The entrepreneur's decision
The entrepreneur faces two choices each period. He can choose to stay with the current 
business, or he can sell this business and start a new one with a different idea. Assume 
the market price of a business in period t is given, and only depends on the average 
market performance of this business idea at time t, i.e., P =  P (s t). In addition, assume a 
sunk cost, c, is incurred if the entrepreneur forms a new business.
Let V(Ff(b),t; q) be the value to the entrepreneur of having a business that generates 
earnings q at time t when his belief about the business idea, b, is F,(b). Let y denote the 
discount factor. Suppose, for simplicity, that the entrepreneur expects to form at most one 
serial business. Then the Bellman equation can be written as
V(Ft (b),t-,q) = max [q + y C x V(Ft+i(b),t + l;q)dFt (b ),-c  + P(st) + ^ E t (a)eb+(T*/2} (3)
The first component in the bracket is the sum of the immediate earnings generated by the 
current business at time t and the value of continuation. The second component represents 
the discounted present value of forming a new business at time t. As the new business 
idea is unknown ex ante, the expected quality o f his new idea takes the value of the prior 
mean, b: because the entrepreneur expects to form only one serial business, the present
value of this business is simply Et (a )e b+(Jb^ 2 /  (1 — y).
The question of particular interest is how the evolution of an entrepreneur’s belief about 
his ability and the quality of the business idea affects his decision. To address this 
question, I follow the approach developed by Thompson and Chen (2009) and redefine 
the dynamic problem in equation (3) in terms of beliefs about b. Then, equation (3) can 
be rewritten as
V (b,t;q) = max{q + y f ^ V t b ' . t  + l;q)dG t+1(b '\b ) ,-c  + P(st) + ^ E t (a)eb+°b/2} (4)
where b is the mean of the posterior belief about b at time t, as previously defined. 
Gt+1(b '\b ) is the subjective distribution of b’, given the entrepreneur’s updated belief 
about b at present. Thus, it is normal with mean bt and variance
abs lt+ 1 / f e 2 +  ( t  + i W ) .
Let b* be the critical value of the posterior mean. Forming a new business at time t is 
preferred if an entrepreneur’s posterior expectation of b falls below b*. There is no 
explicit solution for the critical value because it fluctuates over time in complicated ways. 
First, it is a function of the signal received at time t, so the critical value is state 
dependent. Second, the function itself changes over time because of the evolution in the 
posterior variance.5 In order to continue with analytical rather than computational 
analysis, and especially to derive an expression for the hazard of new business formation 
as a function of time, I impose a form of myopia where the entrepreneur ignores the 
option value of remaining one more period with the current business. This approximation 
has been employed in similar problems by Jovanovic (1979), Thompson (2008b), and 
Thompson and Chen (2009). This implies the entrepreneur will form a new business at 
time t if
-  a\
^ < - c  + Et (a )e b+- / ( l - y )  + P (s t) (5)
which yields the approximate critical value
_____
<7+(l-y)(c-P(st))bt = \al,t + ln
5 The posterior variance declines m onotonically, but this has tw o com peting effects on the value function. 
On the one hand, the option value o f  staying with the current business is increasing in the conditional 
variance o f  b . This induces b* to rise over time. On the other hand, an entrepreneur’s expectation o f  his 
ability is increasing in the variance o f  this posterior b e lie f about b. This causes b* to fall over time as the 
expected value o f  developing a new business idea declines.
where B = e b+ab/2. As <?|t =  os& b/(as +  reorganizing equation (6) yields
u* —  asab l  in _( __________________  ^ (1\
1 2 (a^ +  tal) \q+(l-y)(c-P(st))J
Clearly, the critical value, b l , is decreasing in the cost, c, of forming a new business, but 
increasing with noisy signals (<7S2) and imprecise priors (<r^). It is also positively related 
to business earnings, q, the market price of an entrepreneur’s business idea, P (st), and 
his discount factor, y.
(3) A first-passage problem
The event that an entrepreneur first forms a serial business can be analyzed as a first- 
passage problem. Let T be a Markov time that satisfies
T =  m int{t: bt < b *t } (8)
As bt is normally distributed with mean (crs2h + btojy)/(<rs2 + and variance
taj(Jb/((Js +  t<7^)2,1 construct a variable, co, , such that
_  oi+tai t  ajb+tbal
't ~  „2 _ °t _ 5
>bu s a b a s
which is a random walk with mean equal to zero and variance equal to t. When bt < b *t ,
( i o )
C b ° s  ° b ° s
Let co(t) denote the continuous-time counterpart to cot. Then, I can rewrite equation (8) in 
terms of co(t), i.e.,
T =  m int {t: oo(t) < Xx +  A2t] (11)
where
•*i = - ° s  + Ei \ l n ( — ,— T“-------- ) ~ b ]  (12)2 s L \q +  ( l - y ) ( c - P ( s t ) ) J  J
Equations (11)-(13) define a stochastic process that may reach a linear absorbing barrier 
located below where the random walk starts. In a symmetric problem where the linear 
barrier is located above the origin, the distribution of first passage times can be easily 
derived using the Bachelier-Levy formula (Cox and Miller 1965 pp221). For this purpose, 
I make a transformation of equation (11) to obtain the upcrossing time
T = m int {t: co(t) >  ( i +  C2 O O 4)
where ^  , and (2 = ~ ^ 2  • Equations (11) and (14) describe two symmetric
stochastic processes that generate identical results for the first passage time.
Two issues regarding the absorbing barrier merit discussion. First, to ensure the present 
problem is valid, we need the process, co(t), to start below the absorbing barrier. This 
requires >  0- Second, the sign of the slope of the barrier, £2, has some implications on 
whether an entrepreneur will ever form a serial business. If ( 2 <  0 , the barrier is 
downward sloping. Thus, no matter in what direction co(t) moves, it will eventually reach 
the barrier. This indicates that the probability o f an entrepreneur ever forming a serial 
business is one in this case, and new business formation is only a matter of time. If 
(2  >  0, the absorbing barrier has a positive slope. In this case, whether co(t) will ever 
reach the barrier is uncertain, depending on the specific sample path. Both results can be 
easily derived in the following analysis of the probability of serial business formation.
(4) The probability o f  serial business formation
The probability distribution of the first passage times T is given by the Bachelier-Levy 
formula,
P(T, Ci, C2) =  ® (~  i ^ f r r ) +  (15)
where 0 ( . ) is a standard normal integral. Let T —> oo. Equation (15) generates some 
intuitive results about the probability that an entrepreneur ever forms a new business,
N ( 1  i f  b < W
limr _ P ( r , C 1,C2) = [ e - z « 2 < 1  i f  b > w  (16)
where W  = In (— -— ^ -------- \
\q+(l-Y)(c-P(st))J
When T —*■ oo, an entrepreneur has perfectly learned about the true value of his current 
business idea, b. Meanwhile, equation (6) indicates that the critical value of forming a 
new business, /?£, equals W, as t  -» qo and the posterior variance, <j£t , becomes zero. Thus, 
consistent with the previous intuition, an entrepreneur will eventually get rid of a low- 
value business idea and form a new business if b < W. On the contrary, if the current 
business idea is profitable, there is only a certain possibility that an entrepreneur may 
unwisely give up this business in order to pursue a different one. The probability of 
mistakenly starting a new business increases if the cost, c, of forming a new business is 
low, the market price of the current business, P (st) , is high, or the entrepreneur’s 
discount factor, y, is large. Also notice the precision of public signals, 1/<ts2, does not 
affect an entrepreneur’s decision.
As far as empiricists are concerned, the only element that is observable in the present 
model is business earnings, which is a common variable recorded in almost all survey 
data. Thus, it would be interesting to question how business performance affects the 
likelihood that an entrepreneur decides to form a new venture. Figure 1 presents plots of 
the probability distribution (15) against business earnings, q. Holding the quality of 
business idea, b, constant, the graph shows that the probability of an entrepreneur 
forming a new business is monotonically increasing in business earnings, although at a
decreasing rate. At any level of business earnings, the probability of new business 
formation is higher if the entrepreneur has a lower-value business idea. This result yields 
the first testable proposition in the model.
PI. For any given business quality, the probability o f  selling the current business and 
forming a new business is increasing in current business earnings.
In Figure 2, the probability of new business formation varies with the value of the 
business idea, b, when business earnings, q , are held constant. For five possible values of 
q, we consistently observe the pattern that the probability of new business formation 
starts from nearly one when b is very small, decreases at an increasing rate as business 
quality rises, and eventually declines asymptotically to zero as b becomes sufficiently 
large. Moreover, as I gradually increase business earnings from 2000 to 6000, the 
probability curve is also moving to the right. Because ability and quality of business idea
b~-3 .-b=0/b=J ! b z
SS
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FIGURE 2.1 Probability o f  Forming a N ew  Business as Business Earnings Change 
(Parameter values: c =  2 0 0 ,P ( s t ) =  0 , b =  20, <rs2 =  5 , er^  — 0.1, T =  5, y  =  0 .5 )
are independent in the model, but complementary to each other in the production
technology, entrepreneurs who achieved greater earnings must have higher ability
relative to people in the same or similar line of business. Thus the model also predicts 
that higher-ability entrepreneurs are more likely to form a serial business. The above 
results are summarized in the following two propositions.
P2. The likelihood o f  an entrepreneur forming a serial business is decreasing in the 
quality o f  his current business idea.
P3. Serial business formation is more likely to happen i f  an entrepreneur has higher 
ability.
The present model focuses on first-time entrepreneurs and their decision to form a second 
business. This framework can be easily extended to characterize their subsequent 
behavior of starting a third or even more serial ventures. This time I focus on 
entrepreneurs who are in their second businesses, and relax the assumption that 
entrepreneurs can only start one serial venture. These second-round entrepreneurs then 
face the same business choice as they did the first time, and the whole decision-making 
process starts again. Recall from Proposition 1, entrepreneurs who started a second 
venture are those who had higher earnings from the first business. Moreover, given the 
quality level o f business idea, higher earnings correspond to higher entrepreneurial 
abilities. Because the business idea is a random draw and has no correlation with ability, 
ability in the population of second-round entrepreneurs is stochastically greater than 
ability among first-round entrepreneurs. This result has two further implications.
First, as Proposition 3 suggests, higher-ability entrepreneurs have a higher likelihood of 
forming a new business. Thus, second-round entrepreneurs have a higher probability of 
forming another new business than do first-time entrepreneurs. More generally, the 
model predicts that the more businesses an entrepreneur previously owned, the more
likely he is to form another serial business. This prediction is consistent with the 
empirical evidence presented by Stam, Audretsch and Meijaard (2005). Their study, 
based on 240 ex-entrepreneurs in a longitudinal data set of Dutch firm founders, shows 
that entrepreneurs who exited from their previous businesses reveal a higher preference 
for re-entering the business sector if they had previously formed more than one firms.
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F i g u r e  2 . 2  Probability o f  Forming a N ew  B usiness as the Quality o f  Business Idea Change 
(Parameter values: c =  2 0 0 , P ( s t ) =  0, b =  20 , crs2 =  5, <r| =  0 .1 ,7  =  5 ,y  — 0 .5)
P4. The probability o f  new business formation is increasing in the number o f  ventures an 
entrepreneur previously founded.
Second, as ability is positively related to business performance, but independent of the 
quality of the business idea, second-round entrepreneurs are also expected to have better 
performance in the current business than nascent entrepreneurs. Regarding this 
implication, one thing is worth emphasizing. Gompers et al. (2006) find a positive effect 
o f entrepreneurial experience on current business performance (measured by the 
likelihood of success) among venture-capital backed entrepreneurs, but they also 
demonstrate that adding the success of previous experience as an indication of 
entrepreneurial skills eliminates this effect. Eesley and Roberts (2006a) also have found a
positive correlation between firm revenues and entrepreneurial experience in their survey 
of MIT alumni, and consider it the result of learning by doing. The present model 
generates this similar relationship purely based on selection on ability, consistent with the 
insight of Gompers et al. (2006). It suggests that not only do higher business earnings 
increase the likelihood of serial business formation (Proposition 1), but more serial 
businesses and better performance in previous businesses predict higher performance in 
the future.
P5. A greater number o f  serial businesses is an indicator o f  higher entrepreneurial 
ability, which in turn predicts better entrepreneurial performance.
P6. Better performance in previous businesses is an indicator o f  higher entrepreneurial 
ability, which in turn predicts better performance in serial businesses.
(5) The hazard o f  new business formation
The hazard of forming a new business, h(T, Ci, £?)> is given by
(17)
Figure 2.3 plots the hazards for two distinct cases. In the first case, the true value of the 
business idea, b, is smaller than W. As indicated in expression (16), the probability that 
an entrepreneur ever forms a new business equals one in this case. Consistent with this 
result, we can see from the graph that the hazard of new business formation rapidly 
increases in the early period and gradually falls to a strictly positive asymptotic bound. In 
the second case, the entrepreneur has a better idea and the value of b exceeds W. Thus, 
switching to a new business is a mistake. Unsurprisingly, the hazard of new business 
formation is much lower in this case. It also reaches its peak faster as mistakes tend to 
happen early. The longer an entrepreneur waits, the more he learns about his ability and
business idea, and the less likely he will leave a good business. As the graph shows, the 
hazard of new business formation eventually declines to zero in the second case.
h(t)
b=l8
4 \
b=20
F i g u r e  2 . 3  Hazards o f  N ew  Business Formation 
(Parameter values: c =  5 0 0 , P ( s t ) =  0, b =  20 , a }  =  l,cr£ =  l , y  =  0.5, q =  100 , W  =  19)
P7. The hazard o f  new business formation increases rapidly to a unique peak, and then 
declines gradually. It moves towards a positive lower bound i f  an entrepreneur has a bad 
business idea, and to zero i f  his business idea is sufficiently good.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
This section tests the relationships summarized in Propositions 1, 4, and 5 between 
previous entrepreneurial earnings, the likelihood of serial business formation, and new 
business performance. I also examine whether the results should be explained by 
selection on ability as perceived in the present model, or be attributed to learning by 
doing as demonstrated in previous studies (Eesley et al. (2006a, b)).
(1) The data
The data come from the NLSY79. Fairlie (2005) has pointed out a number of features of 
the NLSY79 that make it a rich data source to study self-employment. For the present
analysis of serial entrepreneurs, what is most important is that the NLSY79 cohort was at 
the age of 14-22 when they were first surveyed in 1979. This allows me to track the 
respondents’ employment history almost since the first time they entered the labor market. 
This property of the NLSY79 largely alleviates potential left-censoring problems in the 
present analysis, although right-censoring still exists.
In order to identify serial businesses and create historical variables, I impose two 
restrictions on the selection of the sample. First, respondents included in each yearly 
subsample must have participated in all the survey rounds prior to the current year. In 
doing so, I can keep a complete record of each individual’s employment history for the 
sample periods, so that any serial entrepreneur would be identified. Most important, all 
individuals included in the sample must have been self-employed at least once in 
previous years in order for them to have a risk of starting a serial business in the current 
year. Second, the sampling periods are limited to the years 1980 through 1993. The 
reason is that the NLSY79 surveys only report income from the previous year. This raises 
an issue after 1993 when the survey is conducted biennially. For example, if I want to 
collect income data for 1994, I should look at the numbers reported in 1995 survey. 
However, there was no survey conducted in that year. The next survey was in 1996 and 
only income in 1995 was reported. As income is an important variable for the analysis, I 
have to restrict the sample to the periods prior to 1994, even though it means I would not 
be able to capture all the observations on self-employment in the following seven survey 
rounds (from 1994 to 2006).
The final sample consists of 25,620 observations on 1,830 individuals, who were on 
average interviewed for 5.8 years from 1980 to 1993. Fifty-six percent of the sample was
male, and 30 percent had a college degree. Because of the previous restriction on the 
observation periods, individuals in this sample appear to be very young. At the last 
interview date (1993), the average age was 32, and the oldest was 36. This age pattern 
reveals one drawback of the sample. As Fairlie (2005) shows, the self-employment rate in 
the NLSY79 data steadily increases as the cohort became older. By the age of 42, the self- 
employment rate for men nearly doubled the rate at the age of 22. Given the current 
sample period, it is possible that the present analysis only captures a relatively small 
portion of entrepreneurs and their businesses in the NLSY79 data. However, for people 
who started businesses at the early age, the observation period is long enough to generate 
results that shed light on serial business formation, entrepreneurial performance, and their 
relationship with selection on ability.
(2) Descriptive statistics
The four key variables created in the data set are: (1) a dummy variable, serial, that 
identifies whether a respondent started a serial business in the current year; (2) a variable, 
npb, that records the number of businesses a respondent ever founded prior to the current 
survey; (3) a variable, pearn, that records a respondent’s earnings in his last business; and
(4) a variable, span, that measures the time period between the current survey year and 
the last time a respondent was self-employed. Below, I provide additional information on 
how these variables are constructed, followed by some descriptive results.
Serial Business Formation (serial= l). In each survey year, serial business owners are 
defined as former entrepreneurs who started a new business in the current year. This 
definition applies to two cases. In the first case, I look at business owners who switched 
to wage-employment but currently returned to the business sector. In the second case, I
focus on self-employed people who were running a business different from the one they 
had a year before.
In the sample, there are 10,659 observations on serial business formation over 1,827 
individuals. Seven percent of these observations correspond to years in which the 
individual had formed a new serial business, while thirty percent of respondents had 
formed a serial business at some point during the observation window. Conditional on a 
respondent ever forming a serial business, seventeen percent of his observations are 
associated with a new venture.
Following Gompers et al. (2006), I provide in Table 2.1 the number of serial 
entrepreneurs observed in each period. Consistent with Fairlie’s (2005) finding, the total 
number of entrepreneurs reported in each year is strictly increasing as the NLSY79 cohort
T a b l e  2 .1
Frequency o f  Serial Entrepreneurs by Year
Serial Entrepreneurs Total Entrepreneurs Fraction Serial
1980 1 10 0.10
1981 7 31 0.23
1982 18 64 0.28
1983 24 106 0.23
1984 39 134 0.29
1985 49 177 0.28
1986 47 210 0.22
1987 71 263 0.27
1988 85 292 0.29
1989 96 390 0.25
1990 71 368 0.19
1991 80 352 0.23
1992 84 365 0.23
1993 73 378 0.19
T a b l e  2 . 2
Frequency o f  Serial Entrepreneurs by Industry
Serial
Entrepreneurs
Total
Entrepreneurs
Fraction
Serial
A g r i c u l t u r e , F o r e s t r y  a n d  F i s h e r i e s 70 379 0.18
M i n i n g 3 11 0.27
C o n s t r u c t i o n 133 525 0.25
M a n u f a c t u r i n g 39 155 0.25
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , C o m m u n i c a t i o n , P u b l i c  
U t i l i t i e s
32 92 0.35
W h o l e s a l e  a n d  R e t a i l  T r a d e 96 433 0.22
F i n a n c e , In s u r a n c e  a n d  R e a l  E s t a t e 19 50 0.38
B u s i n e s s  a n d  R e p a i r  S e r v i c e s 105 457 0.23
P e r s o n a l  S e r v i c e s 164 681 0.24
E n t e r t a i n m e n t  a n d  R e c r e a t i o n  S e r v i c e s 38 105 0.36
P r o f e s s i o n a l  a n d  R e l a t e d  S e r v i c e s 46 246 0.19
P u b l i c  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 0 1 0.00
aged, except for a slight drop in the last four periods. The frequency of serial 
entrepreneurs exhibits a similar pattern. Among total entrepreneurs, the percentage of 
serial entrepreneurs stays in the range between 0.2 and 0.3 throughout the fourteen 
periods. Compared to the maximum number of 13% Gompers et al. (2006) observe in 
their sample of venture capital-backed firms, the fraction of serial entrepreneurs counted 
in this sample is quite large.
The distribution of serial businesses across twelve industries is presented in Table 2.2. 
Although self-employment is common in most industries, serial entrepreneurship is 
mostly related to construction, trade, and business services.
Number o f  Previous Businesses (npb). On the basis of information on serial business 
owners, I construct the variable, npb, to record how many different businesses a person 
had ever owned prior to the current surve . This variable is a measure of entrepreneurs’
founding experience. In the overall sample, the average number of reported previous 
businesses is one point one, with the maximum equal to five.
Previous Business Earnings (pearn). In each round of the survey, respondents were asked 
about their income in the past calendar year from three main sources: military, wage and 
salaries, and business. Fairlie (2005) suggests that self-employment earnings should be 
measured by the total income from these three sources because most self-employed 
workers in the NLSY79 reported their earnings under wages and salary, instead of 
business income. Three reasons are presented by Fairlie (2005) to explain why this 
happened. First, incorporating business owners often count their income as wages; 
second, because of the ordering of the questions, it is possible that respondents already 
reported their business income when being asked about wages, and did not make any 
revision on the answer afterwards; Third, some self-employed workers only reported their 
labor income from the business under wages and salary.
To create a variable that captures a respondent’s earnings from his last business, I first 
construct a yearly variable, rinc, which is the sum of a respondent’s wage and business 
income in the previous calendar year. The variable previous (last) business earnings, 
pearn , is created in the following way. Let the 1982 data set be an example. If a person 
was self-employed in 1981, the variable, pearn_82, takes the value of rinc_82 as it 
records his self-employment earnings in 1981. If the person was not self-employed in 
1981, but had a business in 1980, the variable, pearn 82, takes the value of rinc 81, 
which captures his business earnings in 1980, and so on. Each year, the respondents’ 
previous business earnings are inflated to 2000 dollars. As noted here, military income 
does not play a part in this variable. The reason is that, compared to wages and salary, it
is much less likely that a self-employed worker would report his business earnings under 
this category.
In the sample, average business earnings are $18,617, with $25,599 for men and $9,593 
for women. Table 2.3 compares the distributions of previous business earnings for those 
who started a new business and those who did not. Results from the raw data shows that 
people who started a new business had higher previous business earnings at all five 
percentiles listed in Table 2.3, though the difference starts to fade at the 99th percentile. 
This pattern is consistent with what is observed from the residual earnings, obtained after 
partialing out the contributions of age, sex, education, industry and year. Figures 4 and 5 
provide a better illustration. Both figures show that serial entrepreneurs are more likely to 
be associated with higher earnings in previous businesses, although little difference 
between the two groups is observed at the very top end.
T a b l e  2 . 3
Distribution o f  Previous B usiness Earnings
Total Earnings Residual Earnings*
N on-Serial Serial N on-Serial Serial
Mean 18,400 22 ,272 -136 2,307
Std. D ev 27,860 27,742 26,605 25 ,660
25 th percentile 1,364 3,112 -13 ,562 -12 ,646
50th percentile 9 ,780 13,887 -5 ,318 -3 ,562
75th percentile 24,547 28,885 5,408 8,701
95th percentile 63 ,037 85,354 42,961 57,077
99th percentile 121,241 129,150 106,209 103,578
Observations 9 ,914 745 8,994 671
* Summary statistics for residual earnings from a regression o f  previous business earnings on observables 
(age, gender, highest grade com pleted, and industry and year dum m ies)
Time Span. This variable is created in each survey round to record how many years had 
passed since the last time a respondent reported being self-employed. Time span can have 
two effects on the probability that an ex-entrepreneur re-enters the business sector. On the
whose earnings from the last business fell into the top one percentile. Wealth constraints 
may explain these differences.
(3) Results
Before reporting the results, a brief discussion on the regression models I used is in order. 
It is common practice to conduct earnings and employment choice regressions using 
fixed effects. However, the fixed-effects model removes individuals’ time-invariant 
entrepreneurial ability from the estimation process. Thus, it is not a right model for 
testing any prediction that is based on selection on ability. For this reason, the baseline 
regressions in this section are carried out without fixed effects. I will then compare the 
results from these regressions with those generated using instrumental variables and fixed 
effects (conditional) logits6, and OLS. The IV estimates are intended to eliminate the 
contribution of learning by doing, while the fixed effects models eliminate innate ability 
effects.
A. The Likelihood o f  serial business formation
The first round of the analysis examines predictions (1) and (4) of the model. That is, the 
likelihood that an entrepreneur starts a new business is higher if  his previous earnings 
were higher or he had formed more ventures before. My initial approach is to estimate a 
set of logit regressions where the dependent variable, serial, equals one if a person 
opened a serial business in the current year. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.4 report how 
this outcome responds to entrepreneurs’ previous business earnings {pearn) and their 
prior founding experience (npb), respectively, while controlling for age, gender, 
education, time span, and industries. I do not control for year because there is only
6 Katz ( 2 0 0 1 )  and Coupe ( 2 0 0 5 )  suggest that when the observing period is less than 16, conditional fixed- 
effect logit m odels are preferred to unconditional m odels because the former produces estimators that have 
less bias. Respondents in the current sam ple were on average observed for less than six years.
limited number of serial entrepreneurs observed each period. Adding this control, we are 
probably demanding too much from the regressions. Nevertheless, in an unreported 
analysis, I repeat all the estimations presented in this section with extra controls for years, 
and find no qualitative changes in the results.
The results reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.4 demonstrate a positive and 
significant effect of the two variables, pearn and npb, on new business formation, as 
predicted in the model, although the coefficient of previous business earnings is quite 
small. Column (3) further shows that adding both variables to the regression does not 
change the previous results. However, even though the results are consistent with what is 
implied by the notion of selection on ability, they could also reflect learning by doing in 
entrepreneurship. Thus, the real challenge is to show what is actually being captured in 
the data by the two variables, pearn, and npb.
I take two approaches to distinguish the effect of selection on ability from the effect of 
learning by doing on serial business formation. The first approach is to repeat the analysis 
in column (3) using the conditional logit model. As the conditional logit regression 
removes the effect of innate entrepreneurial ability, any surviving effects of pearn, and 
npb are likely to be attributed to learning by doing.
The results reported in column (4) are markedly different from those reported in the 
previous columns. Not only do previous business earnings no longer matter for serial 
business formation, but prior founding experience has a strong negative effect on the 
probability that a person forms a serial business. This sharp contrast suggests that 
learning by doing may not be an adequate explanation for the results generated by the 
logit regressions.
T a b l e  2 . 4
The Determinants o f  Serial Business Formation
D e p  V a r :  S e r i a l = 1  i f  a  N e w  B u s i n e s s  W a s  F o r m e d  in
t h e  C u r r e n t  P e r i o d
L o g i t  R e g r e s s i o n s  C o n d i t i o n a l  L o g i t
( 1) (2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
P r e v i o u s  b u s i n e s s  e a r n i n g s  ( $ 1 , 0 0 0 s ) 0 . 0 0 3 * * * 0 . 0 0 3 * * 0.001
( 2 . 4 5 ) ( 2 . 1 8 ) ( 0 . 5 1 )
N u m b e r  o f  p r e v i o u s l y - o w n e d
BUSINESSES
Q J9*** 0 . 1 8 * * * - 3 . 7 3 * * *
( 2 . 7 5 ) ( 2 . 5 2 ) ( - 1 5 . 4 4 )
S p a n 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 .22 * * *
( 0 . 3 8 ) ( 0 . 5 6 ) ( 0 . 9 3 ) ( 3 . 6 2 )
H i g h e s t  g r a d e  c o m p l e t e d 0.02 0 . 0 3 0.02 0 . 0 4
( 0 . 9 4 ) ( 1 . 5 6 ) ( 1 . 1 5 ) ( 0 . 5 3 )
M a l e ( = 1 ) 0 . 1 3 0 . 1 7 * 0.12 . . .
( 1 . 3 4 ) ( 1 . 8 0 ) ( 1 . 2 7 ) . . .
A g e 0 . 3 5 * * * 0 . 3 5 * * * 0 . 3 5 * * * 0 92 * * *
( 2 . 3 8 ) ( 2 . 4 3 ) ( 2 . 4 1 ) ( 3 . 6 4 )
( A g e ) 2 -0 .01 * * * -0 .01 * * * -0 .01 * * * -0.01
( - 2 . 4 1 ) ( - 2 . 4 9 ) ( - 2 . 4 9 ) ( - 1 . 3 5 )
AV. L o g  L i k e l i h o o d - 0 . 2 5 - 0 . 2 5 - 0 . 2 5 -0.20
No. o f  O b s 9 6 6 5 9 6 6 5 9 6 6 5 3 6 0 1
Z-scores are in parentheses. S ignificance levels: ***0.01, **0.5, *0.1. Additional controls include 11 
industry dumm ies.
In the second approach, I apply IV estimation. Two additional variables are constructed, 
earnings in one’s first job ifincome) and earnings from the first-year of one’s first 
business (fearn). Both variables are positively related to an entrepreneur’s ability, but 
have little to do with learning by doing from previous experience. Moreover, they are 
both closely related to entrepreneurs’ previous business earnings and even their founding 
experience through entrepreneurial ability. For this reason, I use these two earnings 
variables as instruments for previous business earnings and the number of previously- 
formed businesses.
T a b l e  2 . 5  
Linear probability m odels -  OLS and IV
D e p  V a r : S e r i a l —1 if a  N e w  B u s i n e s s  W a s  F o r m e d  i n  t h e  C u r r e n t
P e r i o d
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
( 1) (2) (3) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) (6)
P r e v i o u s  b u s i n e s s  e a r n i n g s  
($  1,000s) 2 .5E -04*** 3.9E -04*** 2.3E -04** 5.3E -04***
(2.55) (2 .41) (2 .32) (3 .03)
N u m b e r  o f  p r e v i o u s l y - o w n e d  
b u s i n e s s e s
0 .01*** 0 . 12*** 0 .01*** 0.15***
(2 .83) (2 .50) (2 .62) (3 .14)
S p a n 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.006** 0.001 0 .01***
(0.41) (0 .66) (0 .58) (2 .26) (0 .98) (3 .14)
H i g h e s t  g r a d e  c o m p l e t e d 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003*** 0.001 0 .002*
(0 .87) (0 .59) (1 .54) (2 .37) (1 .06) (1 .80)
M a l e ( —1) 0.01 0.01 0 .01* 0.00 0.01 -0.01
(1 .26) (0 .88) (1 .79) (0 .74) (1 .19) (-0 .67)
AGE 0 .02*** 0 .02*** 0 .02*** 0 .02*** 0 09*** 0 .02***
(2.36) (2 .34) (2 .41) (2 .53) (2.38) (2 .48)
-3.6E - -3.6E- -3.8E - -4.9E - -3.8E- -5.4E-
( A g e ) 2 q4 *** Q4*** 04*** 04*** 04*** 04***
(-2 .38) (-2 .38) (-2 .48) (-3 .01) (-2 .47) (-3 .20)
A d j  R - s q u a r e d 0.01 0.01 0.01 . . . 0.01 . . .
N o .  o f O b s 9665 9665 9665 9665 9665 9665
/-statistics are in parentheses. S ignificance levels: ***0.01, **0.5, *0.1. Additional controls include 11 
industry dum m ies. In all regressions, instruments are f income  and fearn.
First, I repeat the analysis in columns (1) through (3) of Table 2.4, substituting the linear 
probability model for the logit. The results, shown in columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 
2.5, are consistent with those from the logit regressions. Next, three IV estimations are 
implemented with both instruments. The results are reported in columns (2), (4) and (6) 
o f Table 2.5, which all, again, have the predicted signs and are statistically significant. It 
is interesting to note that, contrary to expectations, the IV estimations generate larger 
coefficients for both variables of interest. As the results from IV estimations are solely 
driven by selection on ability, they provide support for propositions 1 and 4 in the model.
B. Earnings from the Current Business
The second task in the analysis is to examine propositions (5) and (6) which predict a 
positive effect of the number of ventures an entrepreneur has founded and performance in 
prior business on earnings in the current business.
Column (1) of Table 2.6 reports the results of the OLS regression, which confounds 
selection and learning effects. The regression shows a positive effect of previous business 
earnings on current earnings, but no effect of the number of businesses previously owned. 
Column (2) reports IV regressions, using the same instruments as previously, and 
intended again to isolate the effects of selection on ability. The IV estimation returns a 
large positive point estimate for the effect of founding experience, although this is very 
imprecisely estimated and statistically insignificant. The effect of previous business 
earnings on current earnings is more precisely estimated, and plausibly indicates that 
current business earnings increase by $720 with each $1,000 increase in previous 
business earnings. Finally, column (3) of Table 2.6 reports the results of fixed effects 
estimation. The positive effect of previous business earnings is eliminated. The point 
estimate of the effect of previous business ownership remains large and positive, and is 
now significant at the ten percent level.
These results suggest that selection on ability and learning by doing both have a role to 
play in determining current business earnings. First, the persistence of the effect of prior 
business earnings as we move from OLS to IV, and its elimination in the fixed effects 
model, indicate that the correlation between previous and current business earnings is 
entirely because of selection effects; Second, the significance of the number of
plays a role in linking prior founding experience to current earnings.
T a b l e  2 . 6
______________  Current Business Earnings and Previous Business Experience--------------- -------
D e p  V a r : C u r r e n t  B u s i n e s s  E a r n i n g s , $  1 , 0 0 0 s
OLS IV F i x e d - E f f e c t s  OLS
( 0 (2 ) (3)
N u m b e r  o f  p r e v i o u s l y - o w n e d  b u s i n e s s e s - 0 . 0 5 9 . 3 3 8 . 0 8 *
( - 0 . 0 3 ) ( 0 . 4 7 ) ( 1 . 7 9 )
P r e v i o u s  b u s i n e s s  e a r n i n g s  ( $  1 , 0 0 0 s ) 0 . 6 2 * * *
q  72* * * - 0 . 0 7
( 1 3 . 0 1 ) ( 9 . 4 9 ) ( - 0 . 8 1 )
S p a n - 0 . 2 3 0 . 6 1 0.88
( - 0 . 3 7 ) ( 0 . 4 3 ) ( 0 . 7 1 )
H i g h e s t  g r a d e  c o m p l e t e d
j 7 2 * * * 1 . 6 5 * * - 1 . 5
( 3 . 2 8 ) ( 2 . 2 8 ) ( - 0 . 3 8 )
A g e 3 . 8 8 2 . 4 8 2 . 4
( 0 . 9 ) ( 0 . 5 3 ) ( 0 . 3 6 )
( A g e ) 2 - 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 0 6 - 0 . 0 6
( - 0 . 9 1 ) ( - 0 . 7 2 ) ( - 0 . 5 4 )
M a l e ( = 1 ) 8 . 3 7 * * * 6 . 6 9 * * —
( 2 . 9 8 ) (2 .21 ) . . .
F - s t a t i s t i c 1 9 . 2 8 1 4 . 4 5
1.41
N o .  o f  O b s 6 3 6 6 3 6 6 3 6
As the contribution of entrepreneurial ability is eliminated from the fixed effects
regression, the results suggest that entrepreneurs learn from past experience without 
regard to their performance in previous businesses. This finding is in contrast to the 
Gompers et al. (2006) study of venture capital-backed firms, where it was suggested that 
only successful past experiences engender future success. In their study, business 
performance is measured by a binary indicator of success or failure. They find that serial 
entrepreneurs with successful prior businesses have a higher rate of success than first­
time entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs who failed before. Founding experience, however, 
does not matter once prior success is considered.7 Gompers et al. (2006) favor an 
interpretation of selection on ability over selective learning by doing. However, using 
prior success as a proxy for entrepreneurial skills may raise a potential issue as this 
variable also captures heterogeneous learning by entrepreneurs. The result of Gompers et 
al.'s (2006) result, therefore, could be driven by different forces other than 
entrepreneurial skills. For example, their result could arise because learning from 
successful experience is more valuable, or because high-ability entrepreneurs learn faster 
from prior experience.
2.4 Conclusions
This paper explores the idea that serial entrepreneurial behavior could be a reflection of 
selection on ability. It develops a framework where entrepreneurs do not perfectly 
observe their abilities, and their business ideas come as a random draw. Without learning 
by doing, the model predicts that entrepreneurs from successful ventures are exposed to a 
higher incentive to pursue a new business idea if the current idea does not appear to be 
particularly attractive. It also predicts a positive correlation between prior entrepreneurial 
experience and the likelihood of new business formation and the performance of current 
venture.
While the model focuses on the role of selection in serial entrepreneurship, I do not 
intend to discount the notion that learning by doing in prior experience could also 
encourage entrepreneurs to explore new business opportunities and further improve their 
performance in new ventures. In fact, the empirical analysis provides evidence of both
7 Indeed, they observe little difference between the predicted success rate o f  serial entrepreneurs who had 
failed in the previous business (22 . 1%) and that o f  entrepreneurs who had founded only one business 
( 2 0 . 9 % ) .
types of learning among serial entrepreneurs. On the one hand, the results show that, after 
reducing their correlation with entrepreneurial learning by means of IV regressions, both 
higher previous business earnings and more founding experience predict a higher 
probability that entrepreneurs start a new business and better performance in these 
businesses. These findings support the theory of selection on ability. On the other hand, 
after eliminating the contribution of entrepreneurial ability by means of fixed effects 
regressions, I find that learning from prior experience has a significant impact on 
entrepreneurs’ current business performance. This result is consistent with the story of 
learning by doing in entrepreneurship.
This paper is closely related to the study of Eesley and Roberts (2006a) on 
entrepreneurial learning from founding experience and the recent work of Gompers et al. 
(2006) which emphasizes entrepreneurial skills rather than learning from prior experience. 
The present paper suggests that the empirical evidence presented in both studies does not 
contradict, but rather complement each other. Thus, the paper sheds some light on a 
controversial issue raised by the finding of Gompers et al. (2006) that almost no learning
g
would happen in an unsuccessful venture.
The present paper argues that entrepreneurial experience is an important indicator of 
entrepreneurial ability. Serial entrepreneurs with successful business backgrounds are 
more likely to be associated with superior ability, such as discovering a promising 
business opportunity, or choosing the right management team. Thus, it would not be 
surprising if they continue to be successful in a new venture. Learning by doing, on the 
other hand, could help entrepreneurs overcome their initial inexperience in some specific
8 Their finding is also at odds with numerous entrepreneurial legends who suffered several failures before 
great success eventually cam e. A s Gordon Moore, a co-founder o f  Intel, put it, “[yjou’re more valuable 
because o f  the experiences you ’ve been through under failures” (Berlin, 2009).
cases, and improve their performance later. But if selection on ability dominates 
entrepreneurial learning, previously-successful entrepreneurs on average would be 
expected to have a better performance in a new business than those who failed before, 
especially if we consider the possibility that high-ability entrepreneurs often learn faster 
from their previous experience than their low-ability counterparts.
In this paper, I adopt a simplified production technology in order to derive some basic 
insights for the mechanism of selection. For future research, this model can be extended 
in several directions. First, some random noise could be added to the production function 
so that the omitted factors, such as technology shocks or a sudden change in management 
team, would also have an influence on output. Second, instead of assuming independence 
of ability and business quality, complementarity between these two variables can be 
introduced to the model. In this case, high-ability entrepreneurs are more likely to be 
associated with a good business idea, and also to have a better chance of discovering a 
promising new business opportunity. It would be interesting to see how differently 
entrepreneurs behave in this new context. Third, it is also worthwhile to estimate from the 
model the maximum time it will take an entrepreneur to learn precisely his ability. Lastly, 
given the widely-accepted view that entrepreneurs are overconfident, adding this element 
to the model would allow us to explore whether overconfidence accelerates 
entrepreneurial learning, and whether this would in turn reduce serial entrepreneurial 
activities.
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Who Benefits from Firm Growth? An Analysis of Technology Effects
on Job Turnover
3.1 Introduction
A conventional wisdom regarding human capital and labor mobility suggests that high- 
level workers should have more stable employment. The reason is straightforward. High- 
level jobs are often thought to have more technology elements and higher requirement for 
(firm-) specific human capital. As articulated in human capital theory, workers acquire 
firm-specific human capital by investing in specific training on the job. They then earn 
higher wages than they could receive in any other firm because of greater productivity 
resulting from the stock of human capital. Meanwhile, their investment in firm-specific 
capital is of no use somewhere else. Considering these two aspects, the more firm- 
specific capital a rational worker has accumulated, the less likely he would be to quit his 
job (Becker (1962), Moretensen (1978), Jovanovic (1979)). Empirical literature also 
provides supportive evidences. The most stylized fact is the negative relationship 
between job turnover and job tenure with the latter being positively related to the 
accumulation of specific human capital. Earlier studies also observe higher turnover rates 
for the low-level production workers (Jovanovic and Mincer (1978)). In addition, Topel 
and Ward (1992) document that worker-firm separation is less likely to occur on jobs 
with high wage-growth than on those with low-wage growth.
Regardless o f these consistent findings, there are two exceptions in the recent studies. 
Dohmen and Pfann (2004) investigate a personnel dataset based on a Dutch aircraft firm 
and find that white-collar workers are more likely to quit jobs than their blue-collar
counterparts during the demand-driven expansions of employment. A similar 
phenomenon, documented by Lazear (1999), is at play in a financial services company 
where higher level workers tend to separate from the firm more often. Both findings are 
at odds with the conventional view discussed above. This paper does not intend to 
generalize these results, for they may be specific to the individual firms. Instead, the 
purpose of this paper is to suggest some explanations on this atypical labor mobility 
pattern in the context of the existing human capital and search theories.
One essential element in this line of research is firm-specific human capital. It is 
accumulated through on-the-job-training and is only valuable within the firm. A direct 
result is that the worker’s wage in the current firm, which is often equal to his marginal 
productivity, is an increasing function of the stock of firm-specific human capital. In 
contrast, the worker’s outside offer has little to do with how much firm-specific human 
capital the worker accumulates in the current firm. Since separation occurs only if the 
value of the outside offer exceeds the value of the current job, it is easy to see that 
workers with more firm-specific capital are less likely to quit. Compared to firm-specific 
human capital, workers with general capital do not have such constraints. When the 
outside wage rises, they have greater tendency to leave for another job because the 
human capital they have are equally valued elsewhere. In addition to firm-specific and 
general human capital, there is a third type of human capital in between. As Becker (1962) 
points out, some on-the-job-trainings are neither applicable in all firms nor exclusively 
useful in a single firm. Instead, they are specific to an industry or an occupation. Other 
studies also argue that few skills are really exclusively used in one specific firm and then 
become useless elsewhere. Most human capital and skills are occupation-specific
(Kambourov and Manovskii 2005), task-specific (Gibbons and Waldman 2003), or 
industry-specific (Neal 1995). Following this idea, if a worker’s skill is industry-specific, 
the amount of increase in the worker’s marginal productivity because of the accumulation 
o f specific capital is the same elsewhere in the industry. This new condition increases the 
worker’s incentive to quit for two reasons: first, if he quits, he can find a similar job 
somewhere inside this industry without incurring any loss for the investment in human 
capital; second, he now has more bargaining powers on wage. If the current firm does not 
pay enough to the worker, there is always a chance for him to receive better payment 
somewhere else. In this sense, workers with specific human capital may have as high 
turnover rate as those with general capital. Relating this last point to high-level workers, 
we can show that high-level workers do not always have lower rate of separation as long 
as their human capital is not firm-specific. In reality, we see many cases in which specific 
skills are transferable across firms or even industries. A typical example is Silicon Valley. 
Saxenian (1994) documents that job tenures for computer professionals in Silicon Valley 
is on average two or three years. Not only did these engineers moved frequently between 
firms, but some became venture capitalists, bringing their technical skills and experience 
to ventures they funded.
As we have seen so far, skill transfer alone is not sufficient enough to interpret why high- 
level workers may exhibit higher turnover rates. To see how this happens, we need 
another input, firm growth. Firm growth can be driven by two forces: demand expansion 
and technology advancement. In the first case, if demand increase is temporary, the firm 
needs to hire more low-level production workers just to meet the rising demand. Thus, 
there is really no incentive for either high-level or low-level workers to quit jobs, or for
the firm to fire workers. If the increase is widespread in the whole industry, for example, 
a cyclical demand increase, the firm needs an expansion of employment of both types of 
workers. Intuitively, the demand for high-level workers (such as technical workers, 
professional managers) is particularly competitive because of the high productivity and 
the limited amount of supply. This latter type of demand increase may explain why 
Dohmen and Pfann (2004) find that white-collar workers in the Dutch aircraft firm are 
more likely to separate from their workplace in the period of employment expansion but 
less likely to leave during the following contraction.
In this paper, I only focus on technological change as the driving force of firm growth. 
For the help of intuition, let us first consider a simple story. There are two groups of 
workers in the firm: blue-collar workers and white-collar workers. Within both groups, 
workers differ in how specific their skills are to the technology used by the firm. For 
instance, both blue-collar technicians and white-collar engineers have skills specific to a 
certain technology currently adopted by the firm, though the degree of specificity may 
vary. In contrast, skills of low-level assemblers or office secretaries are more general and 
less attached to any specific technology. An important assumption here is that skills are 
specific at the industry level. This assumption has a direct implication. That is, if a 
worker who has the specific skill leaves the current firm, he can find a similar job 
somewhere else within the same industry. Job separation occurs if the outside offer 
exceeds the worker’s current wage, which is assumed to be an increasing function of the 
worker-firm match. Here I follow Jovanovic (1996) and assume that technology 
upgrading in the firm has little impact on the match quality for workers with general 
skills, but it decreases the match quality for those with specific skills. The underlying
reason is that general skills can be transferred freely from one technology grade to 
another, while specific skills do not have this flexibility. Therefore, the higher is the 
degree of specificity, the greater the loss in expertise and match quality. As a result, these 
workers will choose to leave and work for another firm in the same industry, where their 
skills are still valuable. Their positions in the old firm will then be replaced with those 
who are skilled at the latest technology. In contrast, workers whose jobs involve little 
specific skills would prefer to stay with the firm and benefit from its growth. Thus, the 
story predicts that workers with technology-specific skills have higher turnover rates in 
the presence of technological advancement. This hypothesis receives more support in the 
theoretical context of Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) and Jovanovic (1996). Both studies 
suggest that the worker will hardly switch to the new technology if he is very skilled at 
the old one.
In the second part of the paper, this hypothesis is tested with data from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID). The data set consists of 7285 household heads who were 
employed workers at the time of survey. The observation period spans 1981 to 1987. One 
problem with using the PSID is that there is no information on firms. Because of this data 
limitation, I am not able to observe technological change at firm level, and therefore 
cannot directly test whether or not workers with specific skills are more likely to separate 
from jobs when firms are experiencing technological change. A compromising way is to 
look at industry-level data. The idea is that given the industry is on average experiencing 
technological change, according to what the model predicts, we would expect to see 
higher rates of turnover among workers with specific capital who left the previous firms 
because o f technology upgrading and moved to firms which have not caught up with the
new technology. Thus, the main focus of this analysis is to see how technological change 
in industries affected these workers’ employment choice. Especially, how these choices 
differ among workers with different types of skills? The dependent variable, which 
indicates a worker’s employment choice in the current survey year, is constructed based 
on the PSID’s employment history data. Depending on the certain regression, this 
variable is either a dummy variable which equals 1 if a worker quit previous job, or a 
categorical variable which takes the value of 1 if a worker stayed at the same job, 2 if he 
was laid off, and 3 if he quit the previous job. While there is no direct measure of skill 
specificity, I take the conventional approach by focusing on each individual’s occupation. 
In the data set, a worker is defined as having skills specific to a certain technology if his 
occupation falls into one of the three categories: engineers and computer specialist, 
professional workers, or managers. Technological change is measured by productivity 
growth per production worker in each industry. The data come from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA).
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I run a multinomial logit regression of 
employment choice on a dummy variable for being a worker with specific capital on the 
previous job, specific, and its interaction with productivity growth, vaskill. Observed 
heterogeneity such as demographic characteristics and previous industry categories are 
controlled in the regression. The results show that workers with specific skills in general 
have relatively stable employment, which is consistent with previous findings. However, 
when technological change is considered, workers with specific skills exhibit higher 
probability of quitting the jobs, which supports the prediction in the model. This result
remains significant even after I control for the unobserved heterogeneity, which is 
approximated by the number of previous turnover.
Second, I run a conditional logit regression to control for individuals’ fixed effects. The 
categorical dependent variable in the previous multinomial logit model is replaced with a 
dummy variable which equals one if a person quit the previous job. Both variables of 
interests {specific and vaskill) obtain expected signs, but the estimated coefficient on 
vaskill is not statistically significant. The most probable reason for obtaining the 
insignificant result is that 70 percent of total observations dropped in the conditional logit 
regression because of all positive or negative outcomes. To avoid the problem of losing 
so many observations, the final analysis examines the linear probability model. With 
controls for individuals’ observed and unobserved heterogeneity, the results again show 
that in the presence of technological change, being a worker with specific skills increases 
the chance of quitting by eight percent. The result is significant at 5 percent level.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is the theoretical part of the paper. 
In this section, I present a simple match-searching model incorporated with technology 
upgrading, which generates some testable implications. Empirical tests on these 
implications are taken up in Sections 3 and 4, where I describe the data set and report the 
results from three main regression models. The final section concludes the paper.
3.2 The Model
All search and separations in the model are assumed to be initiated by the worker. The 
worker’s wage at time t depends on the firm’s technology level at that time {yf and his 
employment match with the firm in terms of skill. I define skill match as the difference
between the worker’s skill at job /' (z,) and the skill required on job i at time t (xz/). Thus, 
the wage function for job i at time t can be characterized as
Wit  =  y t  -  ( x it  -  Z j ) 2 (1 )
It is easily to see in equation (1) that on the one hand, the worker benefits from working 
for a firm at a higher technological level (wit increases in y t); on the other hand, his wage 
falls if his skill on the job does not match with the skill required by the firm. Mismatch 
happens in two cases: disqualified and overqualified. If a worker is disqualified, his skill 
level is below the required level. Conversely, an overqualified worker’s skill is too 
advanced for the skill currently needed in the firm. Both of these cases would negatively 
affect his productivity on the job, therefore are treated equally in the model.
Firm’s technological change follows
yt = ( i  + 9t)yt - 1  (2)
where the rate of change at time t ( g t) is a serially correlated random variable, i.e. the 
change rate of technology in next period, g \  is drawn form F (g '\g ), and d F (g '\g ) /d g  < 
0. Skill required on the job / in two consecutive years satisfies the following condition
%it %it—l  ^it  O )
where £-,~N(0,cr£2g ta i). According to equation (3), given the previous requirement of
skill, the current requirement of skill is expected to be consistent with its previous level 
(£(*,, I j v , ) = *„„, )• A deviation {v a r iX i^X it^ )  =  o ^ g tai) can be caused by the rate of
technological change ( g t ) or the variable a, e [0,1]. The term, a, measures the
responsiveness of skills required on job i to technological change. A higher value of a, 
indicates a higher requirement for skill adaptation to new technology.
Consider a two-period model: M and t. In period t-1, there is technological change 
occurring in the firm. As a result, the skill required on job i is upgraded to xt.\, which, by 
assumption, is not observable to the worker until the end of this period.
At the end of period t-1, the worker needs to make a stay-or-leave decision, which would 
be based on the expected match between his skill and the skill required on the job in 
period t. Given the requirement in period t-1, xm, we can rewrite wage function (1) as
w it = V t ~  -  2 i )2 (4)
where x, denotes the skill required on job i in period t. Substituting (2) and (3) into (4) 
yields
Wit = (1 + 9 t ) V t - 1 -  o i g t ai  -  X?c_! + 2ZiXi t - t  -  z f  (5)
It is easy to see from equation (5) that if the worker maximizes his expected wage by 
improving his skill (z7), he would improve it to x„-\, the skill required by the firm in 
period /- l .9
In period /, if the worker stays at the firm, he would keep this skill level, x lt.\. over the 
period. This is because that he does not observe any change of skill requirement caused 
by possible technological progress until the end of period t. Substituting z* =x„_, into (5), 
we have
Wit = (1 + 9 t ) y t - 1 -  O t d t a t  
Differentiating both sides of the equation with respect to gt gives
=  y t- i  -  o W i  (6)
V ;  =  m a x ( l  +  flt) y t-1 -  nc f k a , -  X?t-1 +  -  z f -  The first order condition g ives =  a\( .
N otice that If the worker is overqualified, he w ould choose to keep his original skill.
PL  wit is increasing in g t i f  a t < and decreasing in g t , i f  otherwise.
a e
Proposition 1 has an implication for two types of jobs: jobs employing specific technical 
skills and jobs using regular skills. Workers associated with the former type of job vary 
from production workers, technicians to R&D researchers. As the set of skills needed on 
these jobs is more responsive to technological change (higher a), there expects to be a 
larger variance between the skill required in period M  and that required in period t. We 
can easily see from equation (5) that this would increase the expected mismatch in period 
t, even if the worker improves his skill to xt.\ at the end of period t-\. In turn, the 
expected wage on these jobs decreases as technological change accelerates. Conversely, 
for workers associated with the latter type of job— ranging from unskilled blue-collar 
workers to low-level office workers, the rapid change of technology increases their wage 
for skills required on those jobs are hardly affected by new technology. There are two 
things worth noting. First, as a benchmark, technological change has no impact on wage 
if a t = y t-i/& £- The fact that the threshold value o f a, increases in y,.\ and the wage 
decreases in g t if a t >  y t- i/< r | implies that firms at lower technological level (yt.\) have 
more jobs which are vulnerable to technological change.
Second, the worker’s skill, z„ does not appear in equation (6). This implies that being 
overqualified on the job would not influence the worker’s expectation of future match 
quality10. In the model, the only crucial factor that matters to the expected quality of 
future match is the responsive variable a,. Therefore, technology growth may still cause a 
decrease in an overqualified worker’s wage, in spite of the possibility that overqualified 
skills might become more valued during technological change.
10 A s shown in equation (3), the expected requirement o f  skill in period t, x„ given that in period / - l ,  is 
still xhi.
On the basis of the above specification, let us now consider a simple search story. Firm 
growth is achieved by the adoption of new technology. Technological change in the firm 
affects the worker’s wage through productivity growth (because of the adoption of new 
technology) and the change of employment match between the worker and the firm. 
Every period, the worker receives an offer outside the firm. The dynamic problem facing 
the worker is to decide whether to quit the job and accept the outside offer at the end of 
each period. If he stays, the value of working through the next period is V ( g ) 
considering next period’s technological change. Otherwise, he would earn Q by quitting. 
Since searching is random, it is convenient to assume that the value of quitting, Q, is 
constant for all new offers. Let V(g)  be the value of working in a firm where technology 
changes at the rate of g , then with a discount factor of (3, the Bellman equation for the 
worker is
V(g)  = w{g)  +  p Em ax {V(g'),Q)  (7)
The existence of a unique solution g  * to equation (7) can be proved by following the 
standard way in the literature. The analysis below is broken down into two cases 
regarding the type of job.
3.2.1 Case 1: Jobs associated with specific technical skills
It is shown in the appendix that when w is decreasing in g, there is a unique solution to 
the optimal problem in (7), and V(g)  is strictly decreasing in g.  This yields the following 
proposition:
P2. The optimal stopping problem has a unique solution, $*, and V(g*) = Q. In the case 
where w( g )  is decreasing in g, staying is preferable when g  < g* and quitting is chosen 
when g > g*.
The reservation equation is
Q =  [1 /(1  -  P~)]w(g-) -  [/?/(1 -  /?)] / f  W  (8)
where ^  ) <  0. Differentiating equation (9) with respect to a  gives
To see the first term on the LHS of equation (5) is negative, note thatyyi is less than cr2a  
when d w / d g  <  0. Moreover, F(g \ g)  and Vg'(g ) are decreasing in g ' by assumption. 
Thus, d g * / d a  < 0. Since V(g)  is decreasing in ig, this result means a worker facing a 
higher a  would choose to quit the job even at a low reservation growth rate (g*). In this 
case, it indicates a higher probability of quitting for technology workers whose job are 
related to the latest technology, as they face a higher value of a . In this sense, workers 
who specialize in high-end production (the white-collars) tend to have a higher 
probability of quitting than those employed at low-end assembly work (the blue-collars). 
This leads to prediction 1.
Prediction 1. During technological change, the more technology-intensive the worker’s 
skill, the more likely he is to quit his jobs.
3.2.2 Case 2: Jobs associated with nonspecific skills
P3. The optimal stopping problem has a unique solution, g*. In the case where w ( g ) is 
increasing in g, staying is preferable when g > g* and quitting is chosen when g < g *.
It is shown in the appendix that when w ( g ) is increasing in g , V( g ) is increasing in g  as 
well. As specified in the model, if the worker chooses to stay in the firm for the current 
period, it implies that V(g)  > Q. Since firm growth is characterized by the increasing 
rate of technological change, V'Cg') is greater than Q as well. This indicates that workers
with a  lower than a threshold (ic. ,yt_1/a^)  would always prefer to stay in a growing 
firm.
Prediction 2. Workers with nonspecific skills prefer to stay in the firm  with increasing 
technological growth.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data Sources
The data are from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a longitudinal survey of 
a representative sample of U.S. individuals and their families. The advantage of using 
individual-level data is that it provides an opportunity to address the issue of labor 
turnover across different industries. It is reasonable to believe that a pattern prevalent in 
an industry can also be observed in individual firms.
Among the special public-release files in the PSID, the work-history file contains 
complete information for individuals about all o f their spells of employment, including 
employment status, occupation, industry, etc. Combining these variables with a few 
identifiers allows us to track individuals’ employment history.
Since primary data on technological change are not available, productivity growth per 
worker in each industry (value-added GDP /  number o f  production workers) is used as a 
proxy for technological change. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) compiles 
industry economic accounts; from here I obtain the data needed for the above ratio.
One potential problem relating to the data is that they do not provide firm-specific but 
industry-specific information while the model develops a relationship between worker 
turnover and firm growth. However, this problem turns out to be harmless to the analysis. 
For instance, the turnover of white-collar workers can be observed in four scenarios: first,
white-collar workers from firms at higher technological level leave for firms at low 
technological level; this flow can also be reversed for overqualified workers; third, 
workers left the industry; finally, both white-collar and blue-collar workers are forced to 
leave firms which are driven out of the market. The last scenario does not exist in the data, 
for observations of job separation because of firm closure is not considered as quit, and 
are removed from the dataset. Without firm-level data, an exact turnover pattern cannot 
be observed in a particular firm. However, with industry-level data, we can observe the 
turnover of white-collar workers in the industry, which is the overall flow of white-collar 
workers in this industry. Since the study is interested in the magnitude of turnover rather 
than the direction, industry-level data should be qualified for serving the purpose of this 
empirical test.
3.3.2 Data Construction
This section describes how the dataset is constructed to test the predictions of the model. 
One way to extract data from PSID is by selecting variables of interest for given years. 
There are two types of variables in PSID: family-level variables related to family records 
(along with other topical categories such as work history) and individual-level variables 
with information about individuals (such as age, gender, and educational attainment). 
Additional variables are also available for identifying each individual.
I first choose nine variables related to employment from the family-level variables. These 
include 1968 FAMILY ID, LOCATION, INDUSTRY OF PRESENT MAIN JOB, 
PRESENT OCCUPATON, COLLEGE DEGREE, HPND PREV JOB (HD-E), HPND 
LST JOB (H-U), EMPLMT STATUS, and MOS THIS JOB. Three other variables— 
1968 PERSON NUMBER, GENDER, and AGE— are selected from the individual-level
variables. The combination of 1968 FAMILY ID and 1968 PERSON NUMBER 
constitutes the unique identifiers for individuals. The variables HPND PREV JOB (HD-E) 
and HPND LST JOB (H-U) are based on individuals’ responses to the question about 
what had happened to their previous jobs. Eight possible categories for the response are 
created. The first variable is for household heads who were currently employed; for this, 
the data are available from 1968 to 1987. The second variable applies to household heads 
who were currently unemployed; these data span 1969 to 1993, and then every other year 
from 1999 to 2005. As data on most selected variables are only available after 1980, the 
whole sample with the selected ten variables was restricted to the period 1981 to 1987. 
There is one concern with the dataset. The variables relating to employment have data 
only for household heads and wives. Other family members do not have their own 
records for these variables, instead they are automatically assigned the values belonging 
to the household heads. An analysis based on this dataset will be prone to error since data 
applied to heads or wives would be mistaken if used for non-head individuals. To avoid 
this problem, I restrict the data sample to household heads.
A. Selection o f household heads
Table 3.1 illustrates how the dataset is generated. The original sample is composed of 
eight subsamples for each year from 1981 to 1987. The PSID provides two individual- 
level variables that together indentify household heads in the current year. One variable is 
RELATIONSHIP TO HEAD, which describes the individual’s relationship to the head of 
his family in a given wave. The household head from the current or previous year is 
coded “ 1” from 1981 to 1982, and it is coded as “ 10” since 1983. The other variable is 
SEQUENCE NUMBER, which identifies an individual’s presence in each wave. An
individual who was present in the family during the interviewing year is coded “ 1”. In 
each sample, I use list-wise deletion to remove observations with a code not equal to “ 10” 
(or “ 1” for years 1981 and 1982) for the RELATIONSHIP TO HEAD variable, as well as 
observations with a code not equal to “ 1” for SEQUENCE NUMBER. This leaves a total 
sample of 9423 individuals who were current household heads in each wave.
B. Laid off and Quit
A job move is identified by the variable MOS THIS JOB, which represents the number of 
months an individual had been at his present job. The value of this variable is in the range 
of 0-999. A code of 0 refers to people who were not in the labor force (i.e., unemployed, 
permanently disabled, retired, housewife, or student), and a code of 999 corresponds to 
data not being available. A person is identified as staying with the same job if MOS THIS 
JOB > 12; MOS THIS JOB < 12 implies that at least one job change occurred during the 
year.11
To determine whether a job change occurred because the worker voluntarily quit or was 
laid off, I use the variable HPND PREV JOB for currently employed household heads 
and HPND LST JOB for currently unemployed household heads. Among the eight 
possible categories, category 3 refers to lay-offs, and category 4 includes voluntary quits, 
resignations, retirements, and other various types of separations.
In this paper, quit is defined as leaving for another job. This implies that a person would 
still be working after he quits his previous job. Under this definition, the entire sub-
11 [1] PSID data collection for a given w ave starts from March through September. So it is quite possible  
that the person who had the present job  for less than 12 months actually changed his last job  in a year 
before. To avoid the confusion, this job  change w ould still be accounted as change happening in the present 
interview year. A s the data collection procedure is the same for each year, the consistency can be reserved.
[2] Since PSID data collection process is conducted only once in a year, there is no variable in PSID that 
can record all job  changes that an individual had in each w ave. Therefore, i f  an individual had changed  
more than one jobs in one year, the current dataset can only capture the last one.
sample of unemployed household heads does not qualify to be included in my analysis of 
quits. This exclusion does not apply in the analysis of lay-offs. However, in PSID, there 
are no industry or occupation data available for the unemployed. Given these constraints,
I choose to focus on currently employed household heads, and I exclude the sub-sample 
of unemployed from the empirical analysis.
As discussed above, category 4 alone cannot be used to identify the occurrence of a quit. 
Therefore, I use the variable EMPLMT STATUS to preclude the other reasons for 
turnover listed in category 4, as well as to ensure that people who quit were currently 
working. Observations on people who voluntarily quit their previous jobs but were 
currently unemployed were removed from the sample. Analogously, the observations on 
people who did not quit (but were neither currently working nor temporarily unemployed) 
were also eliminated. In the end, I am left with a sample of 7285 currently employed 
household heads.
Finally, the dependent variable CHOICE equals 1 if a person stayed with the same job, 2 
if he was laid off from the previous job, and 3 if he quit his last job.
C. Industry and Occupation Dummies
Variables on industry and occupation for present jobs are selected from the PSID family- 
level set. These two variables are coded using the 3-digit code o f industry and occupation 
from the 1970 Census of Population. A categorical variable with thirteen values is 
generated for the industries12. Industries such as agriculture forestry, fishery, and public
12 These values refer to agriculture, forestry, and fishery; mining; construction; manufacturing; 
transportation and warehousing; information; utilities: w holesale and retail trade; finance, insurance, and 
real estate; professional, business, education, and health services; entertainment and recreation; other 
services including repair, personal services, membership association; and public administration.
T a b l e  3 .1
Steps o f  Creating the Sample with Multiple Choices: Stay, Laid-off, and Quit
S a m p l e s S a m p l e  S o u r c e N u m b e r  o f  In d i v i d u a l s
1 Individuals in 1981-1987 42970
2 individuals in SAM PLE 1, whose
1. RELA TIONSHIP TO HEAD = 1 or 10 (after 1982)
2. SEQUENCE NUMBER = 1
9423
3 Individuals in SAM PLE 2, w hose
1. MOS THIS JOB > 12, and 
EMPLMT STATUS = 1 or 2
2. MOS THIS JOB < 12
HPND P REV JOB (H -U )= 3, and 
EMPLMT STATUS = 1
3. MOS THIS JOB < 1 2
HPND PREVJOB  (H D -E)= 4, and 
EMPLMT STATUS = 1
7285
4 Individuals in SAM PLE 3, w hose value o f
1. industry categorical variable is in the range from 2  to 
12
2 .  occupation categorical variable is in the range from 1 
to 9
6700
Notes:
S a m p l e  In c l u d e s
1 7 separate subsamples for each year from 1981-1987. Each subsample was
obtained after the selection o f  7 fam ily-level variables and 3 individual level 
variables.
2 7 separate subsam ples, which only include current household heads in each
dataset from SAM PLE 1.
3 7 separate subsam ples based on SAM PLE 2, but each o f  them only includes
currently-em ployed household heads who stayed with the jobs or were laid o ff  
or quit from last jobs.
4 7 separate subsam ples based on SAM PLE 3, excluding individuals w hose
present occupation and industry couldn’t be defined, or who worked in 
agriculture, forestry, fishery and public administration.
Numbers o f  individuals in colum n (3) were calculated after integrating the 7 separate subsam ples into one 
big sample.
administration were excluded from the analysis because of their weak linkage to firm 
growth and technical change. From the remaining industries, eleven dummy variables 
(indy 1-11) were generated. Analogously, for the occupation data, a categorical variable 
consisting of nine values was created13. Nine occupation dummy variables (ocpl-9) were
13 These include computer specialists and engineers; professional and kindred workers; managers and 
administrators; sales workers, clerical, and kindred workers; craftsman and kindred workers; operatives, 
laborers, and farmers; and service and private household workers.
thus obtained. Observations with undefined industry or occupation were removed from 
the sample. The final sample consists of 6700 individuals.
T a b l e  3.2
Summary Statistics: Demographic Variables (3 groups)
F r a c t i o n s
N o. o f  
Observations
M issed
O bservations14
Total ( 1)
People
who
stayed
(2)
People
who
were
fired
(3)
People
who
quit
(4 )15
N o
observations 
on CHOICE
M a l e 34573 0 0.74 0.52 0.03 0.06 0.40
F e m a l e 12327 0 0.26 0.38 0.02 0.07 0.52
A g e
<35
26770
13358
20130
0.50 0.77 0.07 0.17 0
35-44 6275 0.23 0.89 0.03 0.08 0
45-54 3834 0.14 0.92 0.02 0.05 0
>=55 3303 0.12 0.95 0.01 0.04 0
C o l l e g e
D e g r e e
Y e s
26770
5667
20130
0.21 0.86 0.02 0.12 0
No 21103 0.79 0.84 0.05 0.11 0
Table 3.2 provides demographic statistics for the sample. Seventy-four percent of the 
sample is male, 50% is under 35 and about 20% has a college degree. Among the 
observations for males, 52% percent reported no change in jobs, contrasted with 38% for 
female. This difference is consistent with the stylized facts in the literature that women 
tend to have more unstable employment than men. However, this variation can also be 
attributed to the larger proportion of missing values of employment choice among female 
workers. The data also show that turnover rates are decreasing in age. Of the sample aged 
55 years and above, 86% percent chose to stay at their current employment, compared to
14 For each individual-year dataset, there are no m issing values for age, gender, college, or em ploym ent 
choice variable CHOICE. However, when all these seven datasets are merged together, individuals who 
exist in som e years but no others w ould not have observations on age, college, and CHOICE in those years. 
An exception is the variable on gender. In the PSID, this variable is applied to all years. That is, once an 
individual had an observation on gender in one year, this value applies to all years from 1968 to 2005.
15 On the basis o f  the above reason, even if  there are no observations on CHOICE because the individuals 
are absent in those years, there are still observations on gender, but not on age and college.
only 77% of the sample under age 35. On the contrary, merely 4% of the over-55 sample 
quit jobs; that number increases to 17% for the under-35 sample. Eighty-six percent of 
the sample that reported having a college education stayed with the same jobs, implying 
that people with a college education generally have more stable employment.
T a b l e  3 . 3
Summary Statistics: Industry and Occupation (m ultinomial)
F r a c t i o n F r a c t i o n
In d u s t r y O c c u p a t i o n
M i n i n g C o m p u t e r  S p e c i a l i s t s  a n d
0 . 0 1 E n g i n e e r s 0 . 0 5
C o n s t r u c t i o n P r o f e s s i o n a l  a n d  K i n d r e d
0 . 0 9 W o r k e r s 0 . 1 1
M a n u f a c t u r i n g M a n a g e r s  a n d
0 . 2 8 A d m i n i s t r a t o r s 0 . 1 4
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  a n d  W a r e h o u s i n g 0 . 0 6 S a l e s  W o r k e r s 0 . 0 5
In f o r m a t i o n C l e r i c a l  a n d  K i n d r e d
0 . 0 2 W o r k e r s 0 . 0 9
U t i l i t i e s C r a f t s m a n  a n d  K i n d r e d
0 . 0 3 W o r k e r s 0 . 1 9
W h o l e s a l e  a n d  R e t a i l  t r a d e 0 . 1 8 O p e r a t i v e s 0 . 1 9
F i n a n c e , In s u r a n c e  a n d  R e a l  E s t a t e 0 . 0 5 L a b o r e r s  a n d  F a r m e r s 0 . 0 5
P r o f e s s i o n a l  a n d  B u s i n e s s  S e r v i c e s ; S e r v i c e  W o r k e r s  a n d  P r i v a t e
E d u c a t i o n a l  a n d  H e a l t h  S e r v i c e s 0 . 1 9 H o u s e h o l d  W o r k e r s 0 . 1 2
E n t e r t a i n m e n t  a n d  R e c r e a t i o n 0 . 0 1
O t h e r  s e r v i c e s 0 . 0 8
T o t a l  O b s e r v a t i o n s 2 6 7 7 0 T o t a l  O b s e r v a t i o n s 2 6 7 7 0
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics about the industries and occupations included in the
sample. Half of the sample is from industries such as manufacturing; professional 
business, education, and health services; as well as wholesale and retail trade. The other 
half is distributed among the other eight industries. Most of the high-rank technical or 
managerial occupations are embodied in categories 1, 2, or 3, which account for 30% of 
the sample. These three occupations are then combined into one single variable, specific. 
This variable takes on the value of 1 if the occupation observation falls into one of these 
categories; it is zero otherwise.16
16 The final variable (VA) in the analysis is a proxy for technological change, given by the growth o f  
productivity per worker (from 1981-1987). Its construction is as follow s. Productivity per worker is 
obtained by dividing annual value added GDP by the number o f  production workers in each industry.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 The Multinomial model
Greene (2002) and Kennedy (2003) discuss two different logit models for multiple 
choices: the multinomial logit and the conditional logit. The former is used if the data 
have information on characteristics of individuals while the latter is preferred if the data 
have choice-specific attributes which are identical to all individuals. As put forth in the 
data description section, most variables in the dataset are individual-specific (such as age, 
gender, education, and occupation). An exception is the variable on the growth rate of 
industry. However, since it is used to interact with an individual’s occupation variable, 
the interaction variable is still individual-specific. Thus, the multinomial logit model is 
chosen for the regression on the three employment choices: staying, being laid off, and 
quitting. A Hausman test shows that these three choices are not close substitutes, which 
ensures that the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) holds.
To capture the interaction effect between technological growth and specific technical 
skills, an interaction variable (vaskill=VA*specific) was generated. Another interaction 
between technological change and college education (vacolg=VA*COLG) is generated in 
a similar way. The collinearity between these two interaction variables could be a 
concern. As the majority of workers associated with technology-specific jobs may have 
college degrees, these two variables are likely to be positively correlated. To examine 
how serious this problem could be, I first test the collinearity between vaskill and vacolg 
through correlation coefficients. The correlation coefficient between the two variables is - 
0.34 for the choice of being laid off and -0.45 for the choice of quitting. Kennedy (2003) 
suggests that a correlation coefficient of 0.8 -  0.9 in absolute value indicates a high
correlation between two independent variables. Compared to this threshold, the 
correlation coefficients between the vaskill and vacolg are quite low.
The multicollinearity between all independent variables in the model— except dummy 
variables for industries and years— is examined through the use of the correlation matrix 
in the linear regression model. According to the literature, muticollinearity exists if the 
largest variance inflation factor (VIF) is greater than ten, and the mean of all the VIFs is 
considerably larger than one. The result shows that the highest VIF, 6.7, is the one that is 
associated with the interaction variable vacolg. The mean of all the VIFs is 3.72, which is 
not considerably larger than one. Therefore, I speculate that multicollinearity need not be 
a concern in the present model.
Table 3.4 reports the results from the multinomial logit regression. The dependent 
variable CHOICE equals 1 if a person remained at his job, 2 if he was laid off, and 3 if he 
quit. The choice of staying is used as the base alternative. The coefficients on the 
occupation dummy {specific) are negative and significant for choices 2 and 3. The 
computation of marginal effects indicates that compared to the choice of staying, having 
a technology-intensive job reduces the probability of being laid off by 4.1% and the 
probability o f quitting by 3.7%. If productivity growth is considered, however, the 
technological intensity of a job becomes an irrelevant factor in determining whether a 
person would stay in the firm or be laid off (the result for the variable vaskill is 
insignificant). Intuitively, when the firm is going through a bad time, both skilled and 
unskilled workers face the possibility of being laid off. Analogously, when the firm is 
growing, the demand for both types of workers will increase.
Nonetheless, as for the choice of quitting, the degree of specificity in skills does seem to 
matter during technological change. As shown in the last column of Table 3.4, having a 
higher-rank technical or managerial job (i.e., a job belonging to one of the first three 
occupation categories) increases the probability of quitting by 28%. This result supports
T a b l e  3 . 4
Results in Multinomial Logit Model___________________________________
D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e : CHOICE
CHOICE=2 (la id -
dy/d x
CHOICE-3
dy/dx
o f f ) (quit)
O c c u p a t i o n  D u m m y  (specific) -1 369*** - -0.455*** -
(0 .207) 0.041 (0.097) 0.037
G r o w t h  in V a l u e - A d d e d (VA) 1.502 0.047 1.991** 0.188(1.488) (1.026)
In t e r a c t i o n  b e t w e e n  S k i l l  a n d  G r o w t h 2.414
0.077 2.976** 0.280(VA* SPECIFIC) (2.893) (1 .405)
In d u s t r y  D u m m i e s
M i n i n g -0.453* - -0.239 -
(0.27) 0.016 (0.198) 0.021
C o n s t r u c t i o n  ( d r o p p e d ) — — — —
M a n u f a c t u r i n g
-0 .812*** - -0.605*** -
(0 .097) 0.027 (0.075) 0.056
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  a n d  W a r e h o u s i n g
-0 .634*** - -0.321*** -
(0.144) 0.022 (0 .107) 0.029
In f o r m a t i o n
-1 .738*** - -0.602*** -
(0 .393) 0.062 (0.181) 0.051
U t i l i t i e s
-1 .669*** - -0.785*** -
(0.287) 0.058 (0.156) 0.070
W h o l e s a l e  a n d  R e t a i l  T r a d e
-0.201** 0.206***
0.008
0.021
(0.099) (0 .074)
F i n a n c e , In s u r a n c e  a n d  R e a l  E s t a t e
-0 .659*** 0.293***
0.026
0.031(0.167) (0.097)
P r o f e s s i o n a l , B u s i n e s s , E d u c a t i o n  a n d -0 .737*** - -0.078 -
H e a l t h  S e r v i c e s (0 .115) 0.027 (0.077) 0.005
E n t e r t a i n m e n t  a n d  R e c r e a t i o n
-0.04 0.405**
0.003
0.040
(0.289) (0 .178)
O t h e r  s e r v i c e s  ( r e p a i r , p e r s o n a l -0 .431*** - 0.058
0.007
SERVICES, ETC.) (0 .125) 0.016 (0.089)
C o n t r o l  f o r  Y e a r Yes Yes
C o n s t a n t
-2.208*** -1.751***
(0 .114) (0.084)
O b s e r v a t i o n s 26770
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d -13907 .599
the prediction of the model that during firm growth, white-collar workers whose jobs are
associated with sophisticated technology (technology professionals in occupation
categories 1 and 2) are more likely to quit than regular technical workers. It also indicates 
that even if the tasks performed by workers are not directly related to technology in 
production, higher-rank jobs are more susceptible to technical change. This explains why 
managers and administrators in category 3 show higher odds of quitting than lower-rank 
sales or clerical workers in categories 5 and 6.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.5 present the results from the multinomial logit regression 
after controlling for individuals’ observed heterogeneity— age, gender and education. In 
columns 3 and 4, an additional variable (number of previous turnovers) is added to 
control for the unobserved heterogeneity of individuals. It turns out that there are no 
substantial changes to the basic results even after controlling for the heterogeneity of 
individuals. In general, the technological intensity of a job does affect a worker’s 
employment choice between staying or being laid off. But this factor becomes much less 
important in the presence of productivity growth. In contrast, during growth, the 
probability of voluntarily leaving a job increases by 31.8% if the job is technology­
intensive. Age has negative effects on the probability of being laid off or quitting, which 
is consistent with the fact that older people or people with longer tenure prefer to have 
stable employment. Male workers have a stronger tendency to quit a job than female 
workers. People with college education are 1.7% less likely to be laid off, but 2.8% more 
likely to quit. Experiencing a previous turnover in a career increases the probability of 
being laid off by 1.1%, and the probability of quitting by 3.3%.
The results regarding education are more subtle. On the one hand, it shows that without 
growth, people with college education are 1.7% less likely to be laid off, but 2.8% more 
likely to quit. This should not be surprising since people with college education are
expected to have more human capital. Conversely, when the variable of college education 
interacts with productivity growth, its effect on job turnover becomes insignificant. This 
implies that when firm growth is considered, whether or not an individual possesses a 
college degree does not affect his choice between staying and the other two alternatives. 
One possible interpretation is that in general, people with a college degree have more
T a b l e  3 . 5
____________________ M ultinomial Logit M odel with Individual Heterogeneity Controlled____________________
__________________________ D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e : CHOICE_____________________
__________________________________ CHOICE=2 C H O ICE-3 C H O IC E R  dy/dx CHOICE=3 dy/dx
0 . 0 3 1  
0 . 1 5 1
0 . 3 1 8
0 . 0 3 5
0 . 0 0 5  
0 . 0 2 8
0 . 1 4 3
0 . 0 3 3
O c c u p a t i o n  D u m m y _j | ] ]*** - 0 . 4 2 9 * * * -1 12* * *
- 0 . 0 2 9
-0 442 * * *
(specific) ( 0 . 2 1 7 ) ( 0 . 1 0 9 ) ( 0 . 2 1 7 ) ( 0 . 1 1 )
G r o w t h  in  V a l u e - A d d e d 1 . 3 1 3 2 . 0 6 2 * * 1 . 1 4 4
0 . 0 3 0
1 . 8 7 7 *
(VA) ( 1 . 5 1 2 ) ( 1 . 0 5 7 ) ( 1 . 5 0 6 ) ( 1 . 0 5 5 )
I n t e r a c t i o n  b e t w e e n  S k i l l  
a n d  G r o w t h  ( VA * specific)
2 . 3 9 1
( 3 . 0 6 5 )
3 . 6 9 7 * *
( 1 . 6 0 1 )
$ . 6 4 7
( 3 . 0 5 4 )
0 . 0 7 0
3 . 9 6 5 * * *
( 1 . 6 0 3 )
G e n d e r 0 . 0 2 0 . 4 1 9 * * * 0 . 0 3 3 0.000
0 . 4 3 2 * * *
( 0 . 0 7 9 ) ( 0 . 0 4 8 ) ( 0 . 0 7 9 ) ( 0 . 0 4 8 )
A g e - 0 . 0 6 6 * * *
( 0 . 0 0 3 )
- 0 . 0 6 7 * * *
( 0 . 0 0 2 )
- 0 . 0 6 3 * * *
( 0 . 0 0 3 )
- 0 . 0 0 2
- 0 . 0 6 5 * * *
( 0 . 0 0 2 )
C o l l e g e  E d u c a t i o n  D u m m y  
(COLG)
- 0 . 5 0 2  ** 
( 0 . 2 4 7 )
0 . 3 5 9 * * *
( 0 . 1 1 8 )
- 0 . 5 3 3 * *
( 0 . 2 4 7 )
- 0 . 0 1 7
0 . 3 2 4 * * *
( 0 . 1 1 8 )
I n t e r a c t i o n  b e t w e e n  S k i l l  
a n d  C o l l e g e  E d u c a t i o n  
( VA*COLG)
1 . 5 0 5
( 3 . 5 3 2 )
_]
( 1 . 7 6 )
1 . 7 3 4
( 3 . 5 2 8 )
0 . 0 5 9
- 1 . 6 7 6
( 1 . 7 6 4 )
N u m b e r  o f  P r e v i o u s  
T u r n o v e r  ( l a i d  o f f  a n d
QUIT)
0 . 3 9 5 * * *
( 0 . 0 4 4 )
0.011
0 . 4 1 2 * * *
( 0 . 0 2 9 )
C o n t r o l  f o r  In d u s t r y Yes Y es Yes Yes
C o n t r o l  f o r  Y e a r Yes Yes Y es Yes
C o n s t a n t 0 . 0 1 5 0 . 0 5 6 - 0 . 3 6 4 * * - 0 . 3 4 9 * * *
( 0 . 1 7 6 ) ( 0 . 1 2 2 ) n n  u r n ( 0 . 1 2 7 )
O b s e r v a t i o n s  2 6 7 7 0  2 6 7 7 0
L o g  L i k e l i h o o d  - 1 3 0 8 3 . 6 2 9  '______________________________ - 1 2 9 6 2 . 0 4 1
opportunities in the market. Therefore, they are less likely to be laid off; at the same time, 
they have more incentive to leave whenever they feel unsatisfied at the current job. If the 
firm experiences growth, then many of these workers will be better off. The benefits can 
come in the form of either a pay raise or a better work environment, both of which 
alleviate job dissatisfaction and reduce incentives to leave. As a result, in the context of
firm growth, possession of a college degree becomes an irrelevant factor in determining 
an individual’s employment choice.
T a b l e  3 . 6
M ultinomial Logit Model: D istinguishing Increasing Technological Growth from Decreasing Growth^  •• ------©-------.. .V.WUJUI5 IVVIIHVIU51VUI
D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e : CHOICE
c h o i c e - : 2 CH O ICE-3
O c c u p a t i o n  D u m m y  (specific) -1 .124*** -0.446***  
(0 .220) (0 . 111)
G r o w t h  in V a l u e - A d d e d  (VA) 1.180 1.926*
(1 .510) (1 .062)
G e n d e r 0.033 0.432***
(0.079) (0 .048)
A g e -0.063*** -0.065***
(0.003) (0 .002)
0 366 0 545*
C o l l e g e  E d u c a t i o n  D u m m y  (COLG )
(0 .543) (0 .303)
2.660 4.011**VA *SPEC!FIC*D
(3 .092) (1 .627)
VA *SPECIFIC*(1 -D)
4.437 3.144
(22.934) (8 .908)
-1.047* -0.253
COLG*VA*D (0 .599) (0 .320)
3.647 -1.237
COLG* VA (3 .678) (1 .844)
N u m b e r  o f  P r e v i o u s  T u r n o v e r  ( l a i d  o f f  a n d  q u i t )
0 0 412***
(0.044) (0 .029)
C o n t r o l  f o r  In d u s t r y Y es Y es
C o n t r o l  f o r  Y e a r Y es Y es
-0.371 -0.352
_CONSTANT (0 .183) (0 .127)
O b s e r v a t i o n s  
L o g  L i k e l i h o o d
26770
-12960.541
Moreover, if there is a possibility that having technology-specific skills and having
college education are correlated, we would expect the coefficients on both vacolg and 
vaskill—rather than just the coefficient on vaskill—to be positive and significant. 
However, it bears noting that 76% of the sample that had college education is also 
associated with occupations that are responsive to technological change (those 
occupations indexed by specific). The remaining 24% were employed as educators or
17 d is a dummy variable which equals 1 ifV A > 0 , a n d O ifV A O .
doctors who had more stable employment and were less likely to change jobs even in the 
presence of technological change. Differences in the nature of occupations may explain 
why I obtain opposite signs for the variables vacolg and vaskill, even if they seem to be 
positively correlated.
It is worth mentioning that for the group who quit jobs, the positive coefficient on vaskill 
is interpreted as the positive effect of technological growth on voluntary job separation 
among workers with specific skills. But the reverse could be true, i.e., the positive sign 
reflects the situation where this group of people are less like to quit their jobs because of 
the decline of technological progress. To examine this possibility, I construct a dummy 
variable (d) that takes value of 1 if the rate of technological growth, VA, is positive and 0 
if it is negative. This dummy is used to interact with variable vaskill and vacolg so that 
the modified regression model could distinguish the effect of increasing technological 
growth from that of decreasing technological growth. The results are presented in Table 
3.6. For technological professionals, the effect of increasing technological growth is 
consistently positive and significant. By contrast, the effect of decreasing technological 
growth also appears to be positive, and the result is insignificant.
3.4.2 The Fixed-Effects Logit Model
In this section, I use the fixed-effects logit model in order to control for the fixed-effects 
of individuals. A binomial dependent variable is constructed to replace the categorical 
dependent variable from the multinomial logit regression. Changes are made to the 
dataset to better accommodate the fixed-effects logit. First, I omit the option of being laid 
off and only study the two remaining options. The new sample has 6551 individuals who 
either stayed or voluntarily quit their jobs in each year. A dependent dummy variable
(quit) is created. It takes on a value of one if a person quit his job and zero otherwise. All 
explanatory variables remain the same.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 display some summary statistics of the new sample, which bear much 
resemblance of those reported in the previous sample.
T a b l e  3 . 7
Summary Statistics: Dem ographic Variables (quit)
F r a c t i o n s
N o. o f M issed Total People People who M issing obs
Observation Observation w ho quit didn’t quit on quit
M a l e 33838 0 0.74 0.06 0.53 0.41
F e m a l e 12019 0 0.26 0.07 0.39 0.53
A g e 25560 20297 0
<35 12453 0.49 0.18 0.82 0
35-44 6098 0.24 0.08 0.92 0
45-54 3747 0.15 0.05 0.95 0
>=55 3262 0.13 0 .04 0.96 0
C o l l e g e
D e g r e e
25560 20297
Y e s 5558 0.22 0.13 0.87 0
N o 20002 0.78 0.12 0.88 0
T a b l e  3.8
Summary Statistics: Industry (quit)
F r a c t i o n F r a c t i o n
In d u s t r y O c c u p a t i o n
M i n i n g 0.01 C o m p u t e r  S p e c i a l i s t s  a n d 0.06
E n g i n e e r s
C o n s t r u c t i o n 0.09
P r o f e s s i o n a l  a n d  K i n d r e d  
W o r k e r s
0.11
M a n u f a c t u r i n g 0.28
M a n a g e r s  a n d  
A d m i n i s t r a t o r s
0.15
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  a n d  W a r e h o u s i n g 0.06 S a l e s  W o r k e r s 0.05
In f o r m a t i o n 0.02 C l e r i c a l  a n d  K i n d r e d  
W o r k e r s
0.09
U t i l i t i e s 0.03
C r a f t s m a n  a n d  K i n d r e d  
W o r k e r s
0.19
W h o l e s a l e  a n d  R e t a i l  t r a d e 0.18 O p e r a t i v e s 0.19
F i n a n c e , In s u r a n c e  a n d  R e a l  E s t a t e 0.05 L a b o r e r s  a n d  F a r m e r s 0.05
P r o f e s s i o n a l  a n d  B u s i n e s s  S e r v i c e s ;
0.19 S e r v i c e  W o r k e r s  a n d  P r i v a t e 0.12
E d u c a t i o n a l  a n d  H e a l t h  S e r v i c e s H o u s e h o l d  W o r k e r s
E n t e r t a i n m e n t  a n d  R e c r e a t i o n 0.01
O t h e r  S e r v i c e s 0.08
T O T A L  O BSERVATIONS 25560 T o t a l  O b s e r v a t i o n s 25560
One concern with using the fixed-effect logit is the incidental parameters problem. Katz 
(2001) suggests that when the period o f observations is less than sixteen, the conditional 
estimators from a fixed-effects logit regression have a very small amount of bias (as 
compared to the unconditional estimators). On the basis of this argument, I present results 
from the conditional fixed-effects logit model in Table 3.9.
The first column in Table 3.9 reports the results from the conditional fixed-effects 
regression. Since the year and industry dummies are control variables, the estimated 
coefficients on these variables do not bear any economic implications. As shown in the 
previous multinomial model, educated workers tend to have a higher probability of 
turnover, except during firm growth. The estimated coefficient on specific is -0.537, 
indicating that workers associated with technology-specific jobs are less likely to leave 
their jobs. The estimated coefficient on vaskill is positive, as expected, but the result is 
insignificant.
The major drawback to using the conditional logit regression is that 17890 out of 25560 
observations are dropped because of either all positive or negative outcomes. This loss of 
observations risks affecting the significance of the results. To avoid this problem, I 
employ the linear probability model. Another reason for using the linear probability 
model arises from the difficulty in computing marginal effects in the conditional fixed- 
effects logit. The problem can be easily solved in the linear probability model since its 
estimated coefficients are directly related to marginal effects. The results are displayed in 
the second column of Table 3.9. All the signs on the estimated coefficients remain the 
same as in the conditional fixed-effects logit. With technological change, having a
technology-intensive job increases the chance of quitting by 8%. The result is significant 
at a 5% significance level.
T a b l e  3 . 9
Conditional Fixed-Effects M odel (quit only)
D e p e n d e n t  
Conditional Fixed- 
Effects
V a r i a b l e : QUIT
Linear Probability
O c c u p a t i o n  D u m m y  ( s p e c i f i c )
-0 537*** -0.033***
(0 .199) (0 .097)
G r o w t h  i n  V a l u e - A d d e d  (VA)
3.574** 0.208***
(1 .734) (0 .085)
In t e r a c t i o n  b e t w e e n  S k i l l  a n d  G r o w t h 1.951 0.08**
( VA* SPECIFIC) (2 .749) (0 .131)
AGE
0.158 0.005
(0 .109) (0 .005)
0 .849*** 0.07***
C o l l e g e  E d u c a t i o n  D u m m y  ( COLG) (0 .287) (0 .016)
In t e r a c t i o n  b e t w e e n  S k i l l  a n d  C o l l e g e -6 .329** -0.346**
E d u c a t i o n  (COLG*VA) (3 .001) (0 .157)
N u m b e r  o f  P r e v i o u s  T u r n o v e r
-4 .48 -0 .394***
(0 .134) (0 .005)
C o n t r o l  f o r  In d u s t r y Y es Y es
C o n t r o l  f o r  Y e a r Y es Y es
0.105
_CONSTANT - (0 .211)
O b s e r v a t i o n s 7670 25560
L o g  L i k e l i h o o d -1472.5191
One distinctive result is the significantly negative effect of the number of previous
turnovers on the probability of quitting in the current period. This implies that a person is 
less likely to quit his job if he had quit many times before; this contradicts what we 
observe in the multinomial logit model. However, recall from the previous model that 
both lay-offs and quits are considered “turnovers”. It is reasonable to speculate that being 
laid off several times is a signal of bad quality— indicative of more lay-offs in the future. 
In the fixed-effects model, though, only the occurrence of a quit is counted as a turnover. 
If it takes several job experiences for a person to learn his job type, a worker 
characterized by several previous turnovers would be more likely to have found his job 
match. Thus, he settles down with his current job.
Even though the analysis in this section is associated with voluntary job separation, we 
know that in some cases workers prefer to leave involuntarily. Doing so allows them to 
accrue the benefits gained from being laid off (i.e., severance pay or unemployment 
benefits). Thus, they wait until being laid off and then go to another job. Here, the two 
actions (voluntary and involuntary job separations) generate the same results; thus, 
should be treated equally. In the next section, I modify my dataset by breaking down the 
quit term into voluntary and involuntary quits. A voluntary quit is recorded for each 
individual who reported quitting his previous job and moved to another job. Similarly, an 
involuntary quit refers to a person who was laid off from his previous job and then 
became employed elsewhere. Both of these behaviors are denoted by the variable quit. 
Table 3.10 presents the results from both the conditional fixed-effects logit regression 
and the linear probability regression. The estimated coefficients on specific continue to be 
negative and economically significant in both models. The significant effect o f having a 
college degree on the probability o f job turnover vanishes in the presence of firm growth. 
A strong negative relationship remains between the likelihood of turnover and the 
number of previous turnovers.
The estimated coefficient on vaskill turns out to be insignificantly different from zero in 
the conditional logit regression. In the linear probability model, it is positive and 
significant at a 10% significance level. This significance, however, is very sensitive to the 
specification of the model. It disappears once the interaction variable vacolg is omitted 
from the model. The loss of significance may be caused by the existence of collinearity 
between the two variables. However, since the degree of collinearity is not substantially 
high, as shown above, there is no strong reason to remove vacolg from the model.
T a b l e  3 . 1 0
Conditional F ixed-Effects M odel (quit and laid off)
D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e : QUIT
Conditional fixed- 
effects
Linear Probability
O c c u p a t i o n  D u m m y  ( s p e c i f i c )
-0 .639***
(0.176)
-0.054***
(0 .012)
G r o w t h  i n  V a l u e - A d d e d  (VA) 2.24
(1 .466)
q j 49* * * 
(0 .094)
In t e r a c t i o n  b e t w e e n  S k i l l  a n d  G r o w t h 2 .539 0.25*
( VA * SPECIFIC) (2 .446) (0 .146)
A g e
0.048 0.002
(0 .085) (0 .006)
C o l l e g e  E d u c a t i o n  D u m m y  (COLG)
0.445*
(0 .247)
0.041**
(0 .018)
In t e r a c t i o n  b e t w e e n  S k i l l  a n d  C o l l e g e -4 .299 -0 .217
E d u c a t i o n  (COLG*VA) (2 .685) (0 .174)
N u m b e r  o f  P r e v i o u s  T u r n o v e r
-3 .846***
(0 . 1)
-0 .352***
(0 .005)
C o n t r o l  f o r  In d u s t r y Y es Y es
C o n t r o l  f o r  Y e a r Y es Y es
_C O N S T A N T —
0 .329
(0 .229)
O b s e r v a t i o n s 10051 26770
L o g  L i k e l i h o o d -2157 .5664
3.5 Discussions
This paper is the outgrowth of two unusual results on labor turnover from Dohmen and 
Pfann (2004) and Lazear (1999). It is commonly believed that firm growth spurs 
increasing demand for technology and skills. As a result, workers with specific skills 
should have more stable employment in a growing firm than workers with general or 
standardized skills. Paradoxically, their studies using firms’ personnel data show that it is 
the workers from the relatively higher positions in a firm’s hierarchy who tend to separate 
from their jobs.
To interpret the intuition behind their results, my model assumes that all skills are 
industry-specific, but there is variation of technological intensity amongst within-industry 
jobs. Jobs characterized by higher levels of technological intensity are associated with 
much stricter requirements to update skills. Therefore, these jobs are the most responsive
to technological change. Taking this one step further, once a new technology is adopted, 
the demand for state-of-the-art skills arises. Conversely, jobs requiring a lower level of 
technology-based skills (the standardized skills) are less likely to be affected by 
technological change. As a result, the increased probability of quitting can be observed as 
we move up the technology-intensive hierarchy.
To test whether this turnover pattern predicted by the model is a general phenomenon, or 
if it is idiosyncratic to a specific firm, a panel dataset is constructed (again based on 
longitudinal data from the PSID). The dataset includes the employment history of 6700 
individuals from 1981 to 1987, sampled from twelve industries and nine occupations. 
Lacking firm growth, the results consistently support the generally shared thoughts of 
labor turnover. That is, since workers with technology-specific skills have more human 
capital and higher productivity, a higher compensation reduces their incentive to quit. 
However, when firm growth is considered (in the form of an increasing rate of 
technological change), high-rank technology professionals tend to show a higher 
probability of quitting than regular production workers with less specific skills.
One variable I am unable to construct concerns whether, after leaving the previous job, a 
person still worked at the same occupation or in the same industry. This variable would 
have served as a good indicator of industry-specific skills. In the model, all skills are 
assumed to be industry-specific. If a person’s skill does not fit in one firm, he will still 
find it useful elsewhere in the same industry. In this sense, a job change within the same 
industry can be reasonably attributed to skill mismatch. However, if a person quits his 
previous job and begins to work in another industry, he may use the same type of skill or 
have to develop different skills. Therefore, it is hard to determine whether the quit is
caused by the mismatch in skills or other reasons, i.e.-, taste for variety (Astebro and 
Thompson (2007)). If these across-industry job changes happen often with technology 
professionals, the empirical results may overestimate the effect of technology-specific 
skills on a worker’s job decision.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 -  The KLIPS Sample and Variable Construction 
The Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) was first conducted in 1998 (Wave 
1) as a panel survey of original 5,000 Korean urban household and their family members. 
It has been completed up to 2005 (Wave 8). There are two types of data in the KLIPS: 
household data and individual data. Household data set is compiled from household 
questionnaires, which contains questions on household demographics, income and 
consumption, as well as financial status. Individual data set is constructed based on 
individual questionnaires, which mainly focuses on individuals’ economic activity, 
employment characteristics, and labor market mobility.
Based on the structure o f the KLIPS, I construct one subset of individual data and the 
other subset of household data for each interview year from 2000 -  2004. 
Individual-Specific Variables
The subset of individual data contains ten primary demographic and employment
variables from the KLIPS: age, gender, marital status, college education, relationship to
household head, employment status, main industry (previous and current), main
occupation (previous and current), hourly wage, and monthly average wage. Both types
18of wage are measured in terms of 10,000 Korean won (KRW). In wave 6, the 
individual questionnaire adds additional questions on respondents’ siblings. Based on 
respondents’ answers, I create a dummy variable, eldest, in the subset o f the 6th wave 
personal data. The variable equals 1 if a person was the eldest son and 0 otherwise. 
Individuals included in each data set were either household heads or their spouses. 
Individuals who did not have information on hourly income or reported negative hourly
18 From 2000 to 2004 , the exchange rate between won and dollars was about 1 dollar=l 100 won.
income are removed from each data set to limit measurement error. All five sub samples 
are restricted to individuals who were either working as wage earners or self-employed at 
the time of interview. Moreover, people who were engaged in agriculture, forestry, 
fishery, or military were excluded from all five sub samples.
Household-Specific Variables
The subset of household data includes information on household wealth and on parents of 
household heads or spouses. In each subset, twelve variables are constructed, which fall 
into four categories: net household assets, parents alive or not, living with parents or not 
(Heads or Spouses), and financial supports from / to parents if living apart (Heads or 
Spouses).19
Following Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Xu (1997), the formula used to calculate 
wealth in each subset is: Net Assets=Investment in Real Estate + Financial Assets 
(including Savings, Stocks, Bonds, Insurance, Loans to friends or relatives, and other 
financial assets) -  Debts (including balance of debt from bank/non-bank, balance 
borrowed from private route, balance from loans, and other debts). Respondents who 
reported negative or missing net household assets are dropped from the sample for 
reasons discussed in section 3.1.
The combination o f  household and individual data sets
For each interview year, the subsets of individual and household data are joined together 
using the household-specific identification number assigned to household in each wave 
(,hhid**). The five joint subsets (five waves of interview) are then merged using the 
unique personal identification number (pid).
19 For w aves 4-7 , five variables are generated to record whether household heads and their spouses live 
apart from parents and the financial exchange between them and parents.
In the merged dataset, lagged values of log income, log net assets, industry, and 
occupation are generated. The key variable, selfe, is created so that it equals one if and 
only if the person was currently self-employed, but was a wage worker in the previous 
year. For example, selfe equals one if a person was self-employed in 2000 (Wave 3), but 
was a wage worker in 1999 (Wave 2). The reason for constructing this variable is to 
focus on the transition from wage employment to self-employment.
Appendix 2 -  Mathematical Derivations in Chapter 3 
Proof o f  Proposition 2
Let TV(g' )  = w ( g ) +  (2 j™ max[V(g ), Q] dF(g \g) denote the operator defined in (7). 
The contracting mapping of T V(g  ) can be easily proved by following the standard way 
in the literature.
To show V(g)  is decreasing in g,  let g * be the value of g  such that V ( g *) =  Q. Assume 
V(g  ) is decreasing in g , then
f ^ m a x [ V ( g ) , Q ] d F ( g ' \ g )  = J®* V(g' )dF(g' \g)  + QdF(g' \g)  (A .l) 
Integrating both terms in (A .l) by parts yields
Q -  S T  F t a b W g i g W  (A.2)
Differentiating (A.2) with respect to g  gives us/® F ( g \ g ) V g (g' )dg'
~  J f  V g i g l  [ dF ( g \ g ) /dg]  d g ’ (A.3)
As V ’{,g ) < 0 and dF(g \ g ) / d g  <  0 by assumption, equation (A.3) indicates that the
second term in (7) is decreasing in g.  As w ( g ) is decreasing in g,  we have shown that
V(g)  is decreasing in g  as well. Thus, quitting with value of Q is chosen when g  is above 
g*, while staying with Vr(<g') is preferable when g  is below g*.
Proof o f  Proposition 3
Similar to the proof in part A, assume V ( g r) is increasing in g'. Then
/ 05 max[V(g' ) ,Q]dF(g' \g)  =  QdF(g' \g)  + f ^ V ( g ’)dF(g' \g)  (A.4)
Integrating both terms in (A.4) by parts, we have
V m - t f ' F i g ' ^ V g i g W g ’ (A.5)
Differentiating (A.5) with respect to y  yields
-  / / ,  VgiQ') [d F (a ' \a) /dg]  dg '  (A.6)
Since Vg'(g ) <  0 and wg (g)  >  0, equation (A.6) implies that V(g)  is increasing in g.  As 
the worker chooses to stay in the firm in the current period, these implies that V ( g ) >  Q. 
If we only consider the case that firms’ technological change rate, g , is increasing all the 
time, V (g ') should be greater than Q, which indicates that the workers with a  lower than 
a certain threshold would always prefer to stay in a growing firm.
The Reservation Equation
When V(g) is decreasing in g , by using (A.2), equation (7) can be rewritten as
n<7) =  w (g )  + /?[<? -  j f  Vgi g ' ) F ( g  \g)dg'} (A.7)
Substituting g * into (A.7) and rearranging it gives the reservation equation
Q =  Vg ^ F(.9  \ 9 l d g '
When V(g)  is increasing in g,  equation (7) can be expressed as
V ( g ) =  w( g )  + /?{<? +  S f V ( g ' )  -  Q]dF(g' \g)}  (A.8)
Replacing g  with g* in (A.8) yields the reservation equation
Q = - f w ( g - )  + f p f [ V ( g ' )  -  Q]dF(g’\g*)
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